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Abstract
Social media has become an integral part of the Internet and has revolutionized inter-
personal communication. The lines of separation between content creators and content
consumers have blurred as normal users have platforms such as social media sites, blogs
and microblogs at their disposal on which they can create and consume content as well
as have the opportunity to interact with other users. This change has also led to several
well documented privacy problems for the users. The privacy problems faced by social
media users can be categorized into institutional privacy (related to the social network
provider) and social privacy (related to the interpersonal communication between social
media users) problems.
The work presented in this thesis focuses on the social privacy issues that affect
users on social media due to their interactions with members in their network who may
represent various facets of their lives (such as work, family, school, etc.). In such a
scenario, it is imperative for them to be able to appropriately control access to their
information such that it reaches the appropriate audience. For example, a person may
not want to share the same piece of information with their boss at work and their family
members. These boundaries are defined by the nature of relationships people share with
each other and are enforced by controlling access during communication. In real life,
people are accustomed to do this but it becomes a greater challenge while interacting
online. The primary contribution of the work presented in this thesis is to design an
access control recommendation mechanism for social media users which would ease the
burden on the user while sharing information with their contacts on the social network.
The recommendation mechanism presented in this thesis, REACT (REcommending
ii
Access Control decisions To social media users), leverages information defining interper-
sonal relationships between social media users in conjunction with information about the
content in order to appropriately represent the context of information disclosure. Prior
research has pointed towards ways in which to employ information residing in the social
network to represent social relationships between individuals. REACT relies on extensive
empirical evaluation of such information in order to identify the most suitable types of
information which can be used to predict access control decisions made by social media
users. In particular, the work in this thesis advances the state of art in the following
ways: (i) An empirical study to identify the most appropriate network based community
detection algorithm to represent the type of interpersonal relationships in the resulting
access control recommendation mechanism. This empirical study examines a goodness
of fit of the communities produced by 8 popular network based community detection
algorithms with the access control decisions made by social media users. (ii) Systematic
feature engineering to derive the most appropriate profile attribute to represent the
strength or closeness between social media users. The relationship strength is an essential
indicator of access control preferences and the endeavor is to identify the minimal subset
of attributes which can accurately represent this in the resulting access control recom-
mendation mechanism. (iii) The suitable representation of interpersonal relationships in
conjunction with information about the content that result in the design of an access
control recommendation mechanism, REACT, which considers the overall context of
information disclosure and is shown to produce highly accurate recommendations.
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In the past decade, the Internet has undergone a radical transformation. It has migrated
from being a primarily informative medium and has become much more interactive. This
has been brought about by the deluge of social media sites which contribute to a large
amount of content on the Internet. Most of the content on these sites is created by general
public and the lines between creators and consumers have blurred. This massive shift has
been stimulated by the advent of platforms such as blogging sites where users can create
content and interact with other users. This has been taken to a completely new level
by the introduction of social media sites. These sites allow users to create accounts and
then connect and interact with other ``users"" of the site. Users can share textual content
or multimedia content in the form of photos, videos, etc. The popularity of social media
sites has grown massively and an ever increasing number of people are joining these sites.
Facebook, by far the most popular social media site, is estimated to have 1.18 billion
daily active users (users who log in to Facebook daily) as per latest estimates1. When so
many users are potentially producing content, the amount of content itself is enormous.
For example, there are 300 million photos uploaded to Facebook every day and the total
data posted per day is estimated to be 500 Terabytes2.
Having a profile and interacting with friends on social media is a wonderful new way





The vast amount of personal data being shared brings several privacy challenges for the
users. These privacy issues depend on how users use the medium and what expectations
they have from it [MO11]. Some people may use social media as a marketing tool and
would like to connect and share information with as many people as possible while
others may want to only connect to their real life contacts and stay in touch with
them [MO11]. Nevertheless, most social media users share a lot of personal data on these
platforms [GA05] and experience privacy problems which result in unpleasant outcomes
[EOK11]. The effects of such privacy breaches depend on a lot of factors such as who the
attacker is and what information was revealed and can range from mild embarrassment
(employer accessing embarrassing details or photos about a night-out with friends) to
truly dire consequences (sexual predators or criminals using social media to track, monitor
and identify a user as a potential victim) [JEB12].
Privacy problems on social media are of different types and can be broadly defined
in terms of Social Privacy and Institutional Privacy. The institutional privacy threats
to users' privacy are often the result of the business practices of the social media
infrastructure providers which, although legal, may cause a privacy violation for the
users. A particular example is when social media providers track users on other websites,
often in accordance with their own privacy policies and hence legally, using social widgets
which the users can log into with their social media profiles [MM12]. This creates a
possible situation where the social media provider can link the users' browsing activity
with the data on their social media profiles, which are of course accessible to the social
media provider. Monitoring users' online activity, extraneous to the social media site, can
be lucrative for the social media provider as it can then provide services such as targeted
advertising and tailored content which can benefit the business [AEE+14]. In addition to
the possible business motive of invading users' privacy in this way, the often ambiguous
privacy related documentation fails to adequately equip users with information about
safeguarding their privacy and leaves room for exploitation by either the providers or
third-parties [S+10, Ant14].
While institutional privacy problems are important and have been studied extensively
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in existing literature, users also face many social privacy issues. The social privacy
problems faced by users are a result of their failure to appropriately control access to
the information they share on the social media site with their social network, often
consisting of a vast number of people who represent multiple life-facets (such as work,
family, friends, etc.) [MO11]. Such failures can leave a user exposed to a ``context collapse""
which means that information meant to be viewed by someone they intended and expected
was viewed by ``unintended recipients"" with an associated risk of being viewed out of its
context [HLL11]. Thus, a failure to preserve the ``contextual integrity"" of the disclosed
information results in a privacy breach for the users [Nis04]. Users often mitigate
such concerns by employing coping mechanisms such as ``self-censorship"" (not sharing
something due to the fear of a privacy breach) and ``un-friending contacts"" [WLW12].
Such mechanisms are counter-productive for the user and diminish the utility of having
a profile on social media altogether.
The disclosure to unintended or unwanted recipients often arises from the users'
failure to make appropriate access control decisions when sharing the content. One of
the reasons that users make erroneous access control decisions has been found to be the
complexity of the access control mechanisms [WKR14, JEB12]. The work presented in
this thesis focuses on addressing such ``unintended disclosure"" arising from the users'
inability to make appropriate access control decisions by providing an access control
recommendation mechanism which will assist them in making appropriate access control
decisions while sharing information on social media sites.
The users' information may be disclosed to unintended recipients even if they make
appropriate access control decisions. Examples of such instances are ``co-privacy"" breaches
(or ``multi-party"" privacy problems), where the content (e.g. a photo in which multiple
users appear) is disclosed by another user who may be part of that content [SC16], and
``dissemination"" by originally intended recipients to someone who is considered unintended
by the original sharer of the content [Sol06]. These access control problems are beyond
the scope of the work presented in this thesis and are discussed in Section 2.1.3 in addition
to other social privacy problems in social media.
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1.1 Motivation and Thesis Aims
Controlling access to one's information on social media sites is an essential task for
users in order to preserve their privacy. However, it has been found that privacy con-
trols afforded to social media users have been found to be burdensome and they have
been found to struggle in appropriately configuring access controls while disclosing their
information [WKR14]. Therefore, it is imperative to improve existing access control
mechanisms and assist users in making appropriate access control decisions and preserve
the ``contextual integrity"" of their content to safeguard their privacy [LHL+09]. A ma-
jor drawback of existing access control mechanisms in social media sites is the lack of
support for interpersonal relationships [MS16]. The interpersonal relationships between
users are often an integral component of the access control decisions making process
followed by users and failure to adequately accommodate this aspect diminishes the
utility of any such mechanism [FSEGF15, LLLT11]. This has led to the development
of Relationship based Access Control (ReBAC) mechanisms which rely on information
residing in the social network, either in the profiles created by users or in their commu-
nication (messages, posts, etc.) with other users, to define the nature and strength of
interpersonal relationships [FSEGF15]. There have been proposed approaches to assist
users by using relationship based attributes to predict access control decisions made
by them [AFW12, ML12, FL10]. In this way, the user is not burdened with the entire
responsibility of making access control decisions and can rely on the recommendations
made by the mechanism [AFW12]. A major drawback of employing such ReBAC systems,
however, is that they typically employ large sets of attributes to define the relationships,
which can help users better identify the social context of their disclosures, but can
diminish usability due to challenges such as computational overhead of gathering and
processing the required information. Previous ReBAC approaches have failed to provide a
systematic evaluation of the relevant information required to represent social relationships
between social media users which leaves a gap in terms of identifying the most suitable
representation of relationships in an access control recommendation mechanism.
In addition to the ``who"", determined by social relationships, the ``what"", in terms
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of information about the content, also needs to be considered to make informed access
control decisions. Therefore, content also forms a major part of the overall context of
the information disclosure and needs to be accounted for in any access control mecha-
nism [SSLW11, KLM+12]. Previous efforts directed towards recommending access control
decisions to users have failed to combine a ReBAC approach with information about
the content in order to have more information about the context of the information
disclosure.
The work presented in this thesis aims to enhance existing access control mechanisms
in social media by leveraging interpersonal relationships between users in conjunction with
the information about the content being shared to recommend appropriate access control
decisions to users. The work systematically considers various sources of information
relevant to modeling interpersonal relationships on social media and identify the set of
attributes which contribute the most in enabling prediction of access control decisions.
These attributes, representing the social context, are then augmented with information
about the content being shared to create an informed approach of recommending access
control decisions to social media users which would preserve the contextual integrity of
the disclosed information and safeguard their privacy as a result. It is demonstrated
in this thesis that the proposed recommendation mechanism provides highly accurate
recommendations while using less information as compared to previous similar approaches.
This is achieved as a result of empirical evaluation of relevant attributes to arrive at the
optimal set of attributes which enable creation of an access control mechanism based on
prediction of access control decisions made by users.
1.2 Contributions
The major contributions of the work presented in this thesis are:
1. Systematization of existing access control mechanisms in mainstream social media
infrastructures and related literature.
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2. Design of an access control recommendation mechanism, REACT (REcommending
Access Control decisions To social media users), leveraging interpersonal relation-
ships and information about the content.
3. An empirical study of community detection algorithms to evaluate a goodness of
fit with the access control decisions made by users and identify the most suitable
algorithm.
4. A systematic study of information present in social media profiles to identify the
attributes which, when representing relationship strength, can provide accurate
access control recommendations.
5. Implementation and empirical evaluation of REACT using the most ideal subset of
attributes identified and empirically evaluate its performance
1.2.1 Systematization of Literature and Social Media Infrastructures
In order to provide a usable and effective solution to the access control issues faced
by social media users, the work provides a systematization of previous approaches
in literature which discuss social media privacy issues in general and access control
recommendation mechanisms in particular. Additionally, an analysis of social media
infrastructures which looks at the support, or lack thereof, they provide users to maintain
their interpersonal relationships. The analysis found that popular social media sites were
moving towards better support for interpersonal relationships but gaps were identified in
the lack of usability of the access control mechanisms. The identification of these gaps,
in addition to the ones identified in literature, facilitated the design of the access control
recommendation mechanism presented in this thesis.
1.2.2 REACT Design
The primary contribution of this thesis is to provide a design for an access control
recommendation mechanism, REACT, which adequately accounts for interpersonal
relationships between users as well as information about the content being shared in
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order to represent the overall context of the disclosure. In REACT, relationships are
represented in terms of their type by the means of communities created by network based
community detection algorithms. The strength of relationships or closeness between
individuals is represented by examining a similarity between profile attributes between
individuals. Finally, the information about the content is represented by annotations
about categories and any social tags made by the user.
1.2.3 Empirical Study of Community Detection Algorithms for Access Con-
trol
There is existing research which proposes leveraging network based community detection
for access control recommendations. However, there is an absence of a thorough compari-
son of community detection algorithms and their suitability in enhancing access control
mechanisms. The work presented in this thesis provides, to the best of my knowledge,
the first empirical evaluation of 8 well known community detection algorithms where a
goodness of fit is examined with access control decisions made by users during a user
study. This comparison leads to an analysis of the suitability of community detection
algorithms for access control in social media.
1.2.4 Identifying Most Suitable Attributes for Profile Similarity
Users' activities on social media sites result in a large amount of information being available
to be potentially leveraged for calculating similarity between their profiles. Information
including various profile attributes containing personal information such as location,
workplace, education, age or information arising from interpersonal communication such
as messages, comments, likes, posts can potentially be leveraged to estimate the closeness
(or similarity) between individuals. Given such a broad range of options, it is imperative to
identify an optimal set of attributes which can be utilized in any access control mechanism.
The endeavor is to accurately portray the strength of relationship or ``closeness"" between
individuals with the minimal amount of information such that the computational burden
of retrieving the required information to be processed and the intrusiveness for the user
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is minimized. The findings presented in this thesis enable the identification of such a
minimal set of profile attributes which can be used to predict access control decisions
made by users and be used to represent strength of interpersonal relationships in REACT.
1.2.5 Evaluation of the Performance of REACT
REACT was implemented using the most appropriate community detection algorithm, as
found by the evaluation shown in this thesis, the appropriate subset of profile attributes
identified for representing relationship strength and information about the content
provided by users in the form of annotations or ``tags"". The performance of REACT
was empirically evaluated by conducting a user study in order to obtain ground truth
access control decisions as well as the relevant information, friend network to enable
creation of communities and profile information to represent relationship type, from
the users' profiles. The performance was evaluated by using established evaluation
metrics used in literature to evaluate recommendation mechanisms. The results of the
evaluation presented in this thesis show that REACT produces highly accurate access
control recommendations for all users.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 begins with a description of the various stakeholders in a typical social
media ecosystem before describing the major privacy issues faced by social media users.
It highlights the particular privacy issues which the work in this thesis aims to address
before providing an analysis of social media infrastructures which highlights the absence
of support they provide for maintaining interpersonal relationships between users. Finally,
related work in the area of access control recommendation are discussed and the challenges
addressed by the work in this thesis are summarized.
Chapter 3 describes the design of REACT and discusses the different components
it uses to provide access control recommendations to the user, namely, community
membership for representing relationship type, profile attributes to represent relationship
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strength and information about the content.
Chapter 4 describes the user study which led to the collection of all relevant data
used for the analyses in this thesis. In particular, the process of the experiment and the
demographics of participants are described.
Chapter 5 presents a comparison of 8 well known community detection algorithms
where a goodness of fit between the communities created by the algorithms and the
access control decisions made by users is examined.
Chapter 6 presents findings which enable identification of the most suitable profile
attributes for representing relationship strength in REACT by evaluating a baseline of
30 profile attributes and comparing their ability to predict access control decisions.
Chapter 7 shows an implementation of REACT and provides detailed results of the
empirical evaluation of its performance.
1.4 Publications
The work presented in this thesis has led to several papers in prestigious refereed
conferences and journals:
\bullet Misra, Gaurav, and Jose M. Such. ``Social computing privacy and online rela-
tionships,"" In Proceedings of the Symposium on Social Aspects of Computing and
Cognition, Artificial Intelligence and Simulated Behavior (AISB) Convention, April,
2015.
\bullet Misra, Gaurav, and Jose M. Such. ``How socially aware are social media privacy
controls?,"" IEEE Computer, 49(3), pages 96-99, 2016.
\bullet Misra, Gaurav, Jose M. Such, and Hamed Balogun. ``Non-sharing communities? An
empirical study of community detection for access control decisions,"" In Proceedings
of IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis
and Mining (ASONAM), pages 49-56, 2016.
\bullet Misra, Gaurav, Jose M. Such, and Hamed Balogun. ``IMPROVE: Identifying
Minimal PROfile VEctors for similarity based access control,"" In Proceedings
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of The 15th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in
Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom), 2016.
\bullet Misra, Gaurav, and Jose M. Such. ``REACT: REcommending Access Control
decisions To social media users,"" IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances
in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), In press, 2017.
\bullet Misra, Gaurav, and Jose M. Such. ``PACMAN: Personal Agent for Access Control
in Social Media,"" IEEE Internet Computing, In Press, 2017.
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Background and Related Work
This chapter provides a background to the work presented in this thesis by introducing
the social media ecosystem and the various privacy problems faced by users. This is
done through a systematization of existing literature on social media privacy as well as
providing an analysis of state of art social media privacy controls available to users. After
this, the chapter looks at related work in the area of access control recommendation in
social media to provide an overview of previous efforts in this area and also highlight
how the work presented in this thesis advances the state of art.
2.1 Background
This section outlines the social media ecosystem and provides an overview of the privacy
problems faced by social media users. It starts with Section 2.1.1 where the various
stakeholders of a typical social media ecosystem are described before providing a sys-
tematization of literature in Section 2.1.2 which helps in enumerating the previous work
done in the area of social media privacy. This helps in identifying the gaps in previous
work and positioning the work presented in this thesis in the broader spectrum of social
media privacy.
In addition to systematizing existing relevant literature, this section also looks at the
access control and contact grouping mechanisms available in the popular social media
sites to enhance the understanding of state of the art access control mechanisms available
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to social media users. Section 2.2 provides an evaluation of 30 popular social media sites
in terms of the support provided to users for defining and maintaining social relationships
by the means of the access control and contact grouping mechanisms afforded to them
by the social media infrastructure.
2.1.1 Social Media Ecosystem and Stakeholders
Before detailing the various privacy problems faced by social media users, it is important
to understand the ecosystem of a typical social media site. Most popular social media
sites have three types of primary stakeholders:
\bullet Users create profiles on the social media sites by providing their information such
as personal details (name, age, location, etc.), photos, multimedia content, etc.
They are also able to share information such as text, photos, etc., in the form of
``posts"" or ``updates"" with people who they connect with on these sites. Most of the
content on social media sites is created by users which makes them a key element
of the social media ecosystem.
\bullet Providers run the social media infrastructure, store users' information and manage
its distribution to other users and third parties. Notably, providers are in charge of
enforcing their own privacy policies while also communicating these policies to the
users in the form of documentation as well as privacy controls. Most popular social
media sites have a centralized structure where the provider is in charge of the entire
infrastructure. There are some decentralized social networks such as Diaspora1 and
Friendica2 but are not as extensively used when compared to popular centralized
social networks such as Facebook and Google+.
\bullet Third parties are neither users nor providers. They add to the basic functionality
of social media sites by providing services to the users. For example, many popular
social media sites allow third parties to provide applications such as social games
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In terms of the overall ecosystem of social media sites, users need to interact with
both the social media Providers as well as the Third-parties via the user interface of the
social media site. They use these interfaces to update their profile, connect with people
by adding them as ``friends"" (or ``connections"", ``followers"", etc.) and interact with these
friends by sharing content with them and making access control decisions. The access
control behavior of the users depends to a large extent on the mechanisms offered to
them by the social media site. This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Privacy Problems in Social Media
The social media activity of users often entails disclosure of personal information and
hence brings with it risks and threats to their privacy. Such social media privacy problems
can be, and indeed have been, categorized in many different ways. Such categorizations
and classifications help in an overall understanding of the overall spectrum of privacy
problems in social media. For this chapter, the social media privacy problems are classified
in two categories:
\bullet Social Privacy problems arise due to the interaction between social media users
on the social media sites. The most important aspect of social media for users
is the ability to interact with vast networks of friends who represent different life
facets (such as friends, family, co-workers, etc.). In such a situation, failure to
appropriately control access to their content can lead to information being revealed
to unintended audiences which may lead to a breach of their privacy. Such situations
may arise either due to the users' failure to configure access controls appropriately
or even in a situation where they made the appropriate access control decisions but
actions by the members of their audience result in a breach of privacy.
\bullet Institutional Privacy problems arise due to the social media infrastructure
provided to users. These can be due to the business interests of the social media
providers or simply failure to address conceptual gaps in the infrastructure or policy
which leaves the privacy of the users at a risk. For this classification, institutional
privacy will encompass threats arising directly due to the social media infrastructure
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as well as the third party applications used by social media users. A distinction is
not made between these two for this classification as they often overlap, for example,
privacy policies created by social media providers govern how user data can be
used by third parties. Moreover, the users often fail to distinguish between third
parties and the social media infrastructure and have demonstrated disapproval of
third-party access to their data [MC10] while also freely using such applications on
their social media profiles3.
A brief of overview of the various privacy problems and possible methods to mitigate
them, as suggested in literature, are provided in Table 2.1. The various social media
privacy problems are classified into ``Institutional"" and ``Social"" privacy problems in the
table. The rest of this section provides a brief description of each of the privacy problems
shown in the table. The social privacy problems are discussed in Section 2.1.3 followed
by a discussion on institutional privacy problems in Section 2.1.4.
2.1.3 Social Privacy Problems
Social privacy problems occur generally due to the interaction between users on social
media sites. Each of the social privacy problems shown in Table 2.1 are discussed below.
Unintended Disclosure Sensitive information is revealed by social media users to unin-
tended audiences.
Description: Social media users often misunderstand the nature and extent of their
audience on social media and end up oversharing content with unintended recipients
inside their network [JEB12, MO11, LGKM11, CGNP12, HJ10]. As the users often
connect with a large number of people who represent life-facets (work, family, etc.), such
unintended disclosure leaves them at risk of their information being processed out of
context [HLL11, MO11]. Potential consequences of such ``context collapse"" can include
embarrassing content (e.g., comments, pictures) being publicly visible, or personal data
being disclosed to professional contacts [WNK+11, EOK11].
3http://mashable.com/2014/03/19/facebook-games-stats
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Table 2.1: Social media privacy problems and mitigation at a glance
Type Privacy Problem Mitigation
Social
Unintended Disclosure
Access Control Recommendations [SSLW11, FL10];
Audience Visualization [MLA12, LBW08] and Visual Cues [WLA+14]
Dissemination Sticky Policies [PM11]
Multi-party Privacy
Negotiation techniques: Bidding [SSP09]; Voting [CF11, TGN10];
Game-theory [SR16, HAZY14]
Infiltration Relationship-based Access Controls (ReBAC) [HJ10, FSEGF14]
Inference Attacks Obfuscation methods [HKT13]
Institutional
Policy Deficiency
Machine-readable privacy policies [Cra03];
Representation of users' preferences [SHC+09]
Tracking Decentralization [YLL+09]; Anonymous browsing [RSG98]
Crawling Limiting queries [WSB+10]; Behavioral analysis [MVC+12]
De-anonymization Privacy-preserving data publishing [BS08]
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Solutions: Unintended disclosure happens due to the lack of usable access control
mechanisms available to social media users. Development of access control mechanisms
which reduce the burden on the user by recommending appropriate access control decisions
can mitigate this problem [SSLW11, FL10]. Better visualization of the potential audience
with whom the content is being shared can also enhance the comprehension of the access
control decisions for the user and hence prevent unintended disclosure [MLA12, LBW08].
Dissemination : A user shares data with a legitimate recipient who in turn ``re-shares""
it to unintended audiences [Sol06].
Description: Even when a social media user appropriately configures an access control
policy, and only shares with an intended audience, a member of that audience may further
share the content with an audience which is unintended for the original user and can
therefore compromise their privacy [MTKC]. Dissemination can happen via more than
one hop in the social graph [LGKM11, JEB12].
Solutions: There are no clear defences for such privacy problems in social media but
``sticky policies"", which enable the user to control the flow of information they share on
the network [PM11], is a possible mitigation. However, such mechanisms have not been
implemented in social media thus far.
Multi-party Privacy : Information shared on social media may be related to several
individuals beyond the owner. Disclosure to certain individuals or groups, while intended
by the owner, may result in a breach of privacy for other individuals with conflicting
access control preferences [TGN10].
Description: A user might share a photo where other members of the social network are
depicted who may have different access control preferences. This can result in multi-party
privacy conflict [IPA+15]. These conflicts, if not resolved to the satisfaction of all parties,
can result in a breach of privacy [TGN10].
Solutions: There have been proposed approaches for resolving multi-party privacy
conflicts which occur in social media. These include bidding mechanisms, similar to an
auction system, where each party bids for their preferred access control policy and the
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policy with most bids is adopted [SSP09], voting mechanisms, where each user can vote
to select a policy which is acceptable to a majority [CF11] or veto voting [TGN10] and
game-theoretic approaches [SR16, HAZY14].
Infiltration : An attacker, posing as a fake user, becomes part of a user's network in
order to access data that is only available to restricted audiences.
Description: Social media users often share a lot of personal information with their con-
nections on social media sites. Users are often provided with access controls mechanisms
to deny access to people outside their friend networks [JEB12]. Therefore, a potential
attacker may try different ways to access this personal information by strategically
befriending the target user's known friends [Fon11b, PCNR10]. Other methods include
joining open regional networks of the target user [KW08] or befriening highly connected
users (those who have lots of friends), who are more likely to accept requests from a
stranger [PCNR10, BAD09], that help identifying targets to launch such infiltration
attacks [BAAS09].
Solutions: Infiltration attacks may be prevented by users if they can avoid befriending
strangers and are provided with fine-grained access controls such that they can exclude
individuals they are unsure about (even if they have befriended them). This can be
enhanced by improving the visualization of social relationships in terms of their strength
or ``closeness"" [FSEGF14] and implementing Relationship based Access Control (ReBAC)
mechanisms [HJ10].
Inference Attacks : An attacker - either another user, the provider, or a third-party -
infers a user's private information based on the information disclosed publicly by that
user.
Description: Inference attacks can stem from institutional as well as social privacy
problems depending on who the attacker is (a friend or the social media provider) and
how they infer the undisclosed information. The attacker could infer characteristics of a
user based on who they know or connect with on the social media site [HCL06, LHKT09,
TGN10, ZG09, GL16, MVGD10, DTRS12, LWMH13, HSGH13]. A user's interests or
17
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
activity such as ``check-ins"" or attendance of events could also potentially lead to inference
of private information such as age, gender, religion or political affiliation [WBIT12,
A\'AK12]. Meta-data created by mobile interfaces and applications can be used to infer
location by spatial inference on proximity services [PAP+15].
Solutions: Inference attacks can be prevented or at least inhibited by using obfuscation
methods such as hiding certain personal attributes or generalizing details (when disclosing
preferences or location) [HKT13]. These techniques would, however, only safeguard
against large scale inference attacks and more sophisticated and directed inference attacks
may not be mitigated by obfuscation.
2.1.4 Institutional Privacy Problems
The privacy of social media users may be put at risk due to the practices and policies of
the social media providers and these problems, classified as institutional privacy problems,
are discussed here.
Policy Deficiency : The policies set out by the social media provider, which govern how
user data can be collected, fail to safeguard users' privacy.
Description: Privacy policies provided to social media users may be considered deficient
and insufficient as users may simply avoid reading what they consider as legalese and
even when they do read them, may fail to understand the contents [SSM11, FFB15].
Moreover, privacy policies are often incomplete as they acknowledge nominal mechanisms
behind data collection by a provider or a third party, but do not sufficiently elaborate
the privacy implications necessary for users to make informed decisions [S+10]. Another
problem is that privacy policies may not be correctly implemented at the infrastructure
level as this can be a challenging engineering task [AHB04] due to the evolving nature of
policies which are prone to modifications over time.
Solutions: Possible enhancements of privacy policies include creating machine-readable
privacy policies aimed to find a match with users' privacy settings [Cra03] and better
representation of the users' privacy preferences using a ``privacy persona"" [SHC+09].
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Tracking : Collecting information about users to identify repeated visits and track user
activity over multiple web pages.
Description: Traditional tracking techniques can be augmented or enhanced by including
information about users' social media activity [EN16]. Social media sites offer their users
an opportunity to link their browsing activity (extraneous to the social media site) with
their social media profiles. For example, social widgets on websites allow the user to ``log
in"" using their social media credentials and receive a personalized browsing experience
but they also provide the social media provider an opportunity to track their browsing
activity [MM12]. Personally identifiable information of the user may also be leaked by
the provider to third party applications [KW09] and this can be used and correlated with
external sites for effective tracking of the users' browsing activity.
Solutions: Tracking by social media provider can only effectively be thwarted by having
decentralized social networks such as Diaspora4 and Friendica5 [YLL+09]. Tracking of
activity external to the social media site may be prevented by using anonymous browsing
techniques [RSG98]. This has an obvious trade-off as avoiding social widgets and other
third-party tools will also diminish the personalized browsing experience.
Crawling : User information is harvested on a large scale [BAD09], using either data
published by the social media provider to third parties, or data visible to users of the
social media site.
Description: Crawling is often forbidden by the social media providers' terms and
conditions [Fac16]. However, it has been found that it is possible for attackers to harvest
data such as email addresses of social media users just by knowing the names they
use [PKA+10] without having a social media profile themselves [LHKT09].
Solutions: Social media providers can prevent crawling attacks by limiting querying for
public profiles as normal users would not need to access a lot of profiles in a given time
period [WSB+10]. Another approach is to use behavioral analysis to identify crawlers
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De-anonymization : An attacker uniquely identifies a user from an anonymized (or
pseudonymized) dataset, using one or several sources.
Description: In the context of social media, de-anonymization can happen by learning
sensitive or undisclosed information about users from anonymized or aggregated graph
data, often released by social media providers to third-parties [ANH16]. De-anonymization
can be achieved by analyzing the topology of the social graph [BDK07, NS09, PLZW14,
BFK14], observing communication between users [DTS08] or combining information
across different datasets such as their social media account and their online browsing
history [WHKK10].
Solutions: The social media providers can adopt privacy-preserving data publishing
techniques while releasing anonymized datasets of users. However, it has been shown
that the richness of data shared on social media often defeats these techniques and fails
to prevent de-anonymization [BS08].
2.1.5 Focus of this Thesis
It is clear from the above discussion that there are numerous privacy problems faced by
social media users. The work presented in this thesis focuses specifically on mitigating the
problem of Unintended Disclosure in social media by easing the burden of making access
control decisions for social media users. As discussed earlier, this is a Social Privacy
problem which arises due to information being disclosed to unintended members of a
user's friend network which leads to a ``context collapse"" and the information can be
processed outside its intended or imagined context by the user [HLL11, MO11]. These
problems arise mainly due to the inability of users to appropriately control access to
their information, often due to the complexity and lack of usability of access control
mechanisms provided to them by existing social media infrastructures [WKR14]. This
is more evident from the analysis of the existing access control mechanisms in social
media infrastructures presented next, in Section 2.2. After that, Section 2.3 presents
related work in the area of access control recommendations which helps in identifying
how the work presented in this thesis improves upon previously proposed approaches
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and advances the state of the art
2.2 Access Control in Current Social Media Infrastructures
In addition to understanding the various privacy threats and mitigation detailed in
previous work mentioned in existing literature, it is also essential to examine the status-quo
in terms of the access controls afforded to users by the current social media infrastructures
in order to provide a holistic analysis. This is especially important as the nature of such
mechanisms often shape the users' ability to safeguard their privacy.
This section provides a systematic evaluation of the top 30 social media sites [Ale14]
(as of January, 2015) and classifies them into categories offering similar support to users
by modeling social contexts through contact grouping mechanisms. Dating sites, online
shopping sites and sites that were too specific to particular populations (for example,
Classmates for US graduates and Naijapals for Nigerians) were excluded from this
evaluation.
2.2.1 Categories
The evaluation of the 30 most popular social media sites in terms of the social aspect of
the contact grouping mechanisms offered to the users resulted in five levels or categories.
These categories are shown in Figure 2.1. The figure depicts that each level of contact
grouping extends the previous level and builds on it. Therefore, a category at a higher
level, for instance ``predefined grouping"", would incorporate the mechanisms of a lower
level such as ``binary grouping"" and add further granularity for the user. In the rest
of this section, the five contact grouping mechanisms in each category are described in
detail and the 30 social media sites are categorized into these categories.
The individual social media sites were evaluated by looking at their privacy policies
and settings offered to the users, especially in terms of managing contacts and supporting
relationships. In most cases, user accounts were created to examine the actual available
options for users, because this information was not directly evident from privacy policies.
The 30 social media sites were thus classified into the five categories as shown in Figure
21
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
Figure 2.1: The different levels of contact grouping in social media sites
2.2.
Binary Grouping These social media sites have a binary distinction between a user's
``friends"" and ``everyone else"". This results in a scenario where everyone a user connects
with is classified as a ``friend"" (other terms such as ``connections"" may be used in specific
sites) and thus offering no granularity. The user does not have the opportunity to
distinguish between two friends in terms of the relationship shared while implementing
access control policies. If the user wants to share something on the network, she can
either share it with all her friends or make it publicly available to everyone else. Such
a situation clearly does not reflect real-life social relationships which are often more
complex and varied. According to the evaluation, 14 out of the top 30 social media sites
offered this kind of coarse grained friend networks to their users (see Figure 2.2).
Predefined Groups Some sites, such as LinkedIn, allow for predefined groups, which
help users organize their contacts. Users on these sites can create groups to represent
social relationships (for example, ``colleagues"" or ``family"") and use these groups while
making access control decisions (for example, by sharing content to a specific group while
not sharing it with others). While this is certainly better and more granular than the
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previously discussed binary classification, it still compels the user to treat all members
within a group in a similar way. For example, if a user shares something to a ``family""
group, all members, without exceptions, will have access to that content. Figure 2.2
shows that there were 4 social media sites with such a mechanism.
Predefined Groups + Individuals Some social media sites such as Tagged and Hi5 were
found to provide their users with the opportunity of treating individuals separately from
predefined groups. This provides more granularity to the user and is more akin to real life
social relationships where even relationships of the same type such as a family member
may not necessarily mean similar treatment when it comes to information disclosure.
Four out of the 30 social media sites which were evaluated exhibited such grouping
mechanisms (Figure 2.2).
User Defined Groups + Individuals The contact grouping mechanisms discussed so
far have been predefined groups created by the social media site. Thus, the users of those
social media sites would have empty groups such as ``family"", ``colleagues"", etc., and
would populate them with the people they connect with on the network. Such grouping
mechanisms offer no opportunity to the users to create their own groups in addition to or
in place of the predefined groups provided by the social media site. An improvement is
seen in sites such as Google+ and Twitter where users have the ability to define their own
groups (``circles"", ``lists"", etc.). This enables them to create groups to mirror relationship
types which they consider important while interacting on the social network. Figure 2.2
shows that 7 social media sites had such a grouping mechanism.
Computer Supported Grouping Figure 2.2 shows Facebook separately as it provides
an enhanced grouping mechanism which is absent in any of the other social media sites
which were evaluated. Facebook profiles contain a lot of personal information such as
``location"", ``workplace"", etc., and it uses this information to automatically create and
populate ``lists""6 which can be leveraged by its users to make fine-grained access control
6https://en-gb.facebook.com/help/135312293276793/
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Figure 2.2: The top 30 social media sites classified according to the social aspect of their privacy controls and ordered alphabetically for each level
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policies. It also provides the traditional pre-defined groups such as ``friends"" and ``family""
like the other social media sites. Thus, Facebook users have the opportunity to create
their own groups, rely on the ``lists"" created from their contacts' profile information as
well as rely on the predefined groups to define the type of relationship they share with
their contacts. This was found to be the most sophisticated approach out of all the social
media sites that were evaluated in this analysis. Another interesting point to note was
that Facebook provides the opportunity to users to identify friends as ``close friends"" or
``acquaintances"" which signifies an acknowledgement of the ``strength"" of the relationships
shared between individuals on the site. Thus, it can be said that Facebook seems to be
ahead of the other social media sites in terms of enabling its users to handle and manage
social relationships.
2.2.2 Discussion
The evaluation of the top 30 social media sites presented in this section shows the different
types of contact grouping mechanisms provided to the users by each of the social media
sites. The access control mechanisms of these social media sites can leverage these contact
grouping mechanisms, enabling the users to employ these groups to create access control
policies. It is important to note that Twitter is an exception, as its ``lists"" are not used
for access control but for subscription of content by the users. Twitter users create lists
to ``follow"" (or subscribe to) the content they consider relevant or interesting. Moreover,
Twitter is primarily a ``broadcast"" social medium and access control is not considered
to be at the forefront of the users' minds [MO11]. Therefore, an important distinction
needs to be made between social media sites which employ contact grouping for access
control mechanisms such as Facebook and those which do not, such as Twitter.
2.2.3 Summary
The evaluation of the top 30 social media sites shows that some popular social media
sites are indeed moving in the right direction as far as supporting social relationships is
concerned. Facebook is ahead of the others as it seemingly combines the type and strength
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of the interpersonal relationships in its grouping mechanism which can be utilized by its
users when making access control decisions. However, it has been observed that users do
not usually employ these mechanisms when making access control decisions [WKR14].
A possible reason for this could be the fact that the responsibility of maintaining the
appropriateness of these communities lies solely on the users which puts a cognitive
burden on them. Thus, the next step for social media sites would be to incorporate access
control recommendations mechanisms which assist the users in making access control
decisions while factoring in the relationship based factors such as type and strength.
Such recommendations are generally based on learning from the access control decisions
made by users. The primary contribution of the work presented in this thesis is an access
control recommendation mechanism, REACT, which leverages interpersonal relationships
in conjunction with the content being shared to recommend access control decisions to
social media users. Such mechanisms have maximum utility in social media sites such
as Facebook or Google+ where the contact grouping mechanisms are used to define
interpersonal relationships and these relationships may be leveraged by REACT while
providing recommendations. More details about the design of REACT and the types of
information it relies on are described in Chapter 3. Section 2.3 discusses other previously
proposed access control recommendation mechanisms which have been described in
existing literature.
2.3 Related Work in Access Control Recommendation
This chapter has discussed a variety of privacy problems faced by social media users.
One particular problem, ``Unintended Disclosure"" can be mitigated by providing access
control recommendations to social media users. This would ease the burden of having
to appropriately configure access controls to their information which they have often
found to be struggling with [JEB12]. It was also seen in Section 2.2 that none of the
popular social media sites provide such access control recommendations to their users.
This section discusses and summarizes the research efforts which propose access control
recommendation mechanisms.
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There are previously proposed works in literature which try to address the problem
of accurately predicting access control decisions made by social media users. Indeed,
prediction of access control decisions and policies has been a well researched topic in
several domains and there have been efforts to provide access control mechanisms in
mobile and ubiquitous applications using factors such as location [ACD+06, RKY06],
temporal effects [JBLG05] and interconnection of devices [SKW15]. These factors, while
being useful in other systems, have little scope of being utilized for access control in social
media sites, where this information may not be always available. In such settings, the
social context of information disclosure is considered essential to enable the formulation
of access control policies in a way which preserves the ``contextual integrity"" of the
information [MS16].
Previous work has leveraged the ``social identity theory"" [Hog16] to identify the
privacy norms which enable definition of the social context of disclosure to assist the user
in configuring appropriate access control policies [CLB+16]. The social context can also
be derived from information which facilitate the definition of social relationships on these
media. These interpersonal relationships can be defined in terms of their ``type"" (friend,
colleague, family, etc.) which is often represented using communities [FL10] and strength
or ``closeness"" which is represented by similarity of profile attributes [AFW12, ML12].
The information to represent these relationships is therefore available in the social
network itself and can be leveraged in any potential access control recommendation
mechanism. In addition to social relationships, the content which is being disclosed is
an integral part of the context of the disclosure and also plays an important role in the
formulation of a desired access control policy. Therefore, the information about the
content being shared (text, photos, etc.) can be used to predict and recommend access
control decisions [SSLW11, KLM+12]. The rest of this section identifies and summarizes
some of the important efforts in literature which focus on access control prediction
in social media, particularly leveraging social relationships and information about the
content. Table 2.2, at the end of the section, shows the type of information that was
considered some of the approaches discussed in this section.
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2.3.1 Relationship Type
Social media users often interact with vast networks of friends with whom they share
various types of social relationships outside the social network. An effective way of
representing these interpersonal relationships between social media users is by partitioning
their friend networks into communities. These communities can be created by using the
network connections between the friends of a user by employing community detection
algorithms [Dan09, FL10]. It has been proposed by several previous works that such
communities can be leveraged to ease the burden on the user while making access control
decisions while sharing on social media sites [CS14, JO10, Dan09, FL10]. It has also been
found that users prefer to select their audience from predefined communities as compared
to their entire friend lists [JO10] as they visualize their audience in the form of partitions
or sub-structures [KBHC12]. This further enhances the argument of partitioning their
friend networks into communities and leveraging these communities to enhance access
control mechanisms. A particular way of reducing user effort in creating access control
policies is to ask them to make decisions with respect to one or some members in a
particular ``community"" (created by the algorithm), and then implement that decision
for the other members in that community [FL10, CS14]. In this way, the user does not
have to make decisions with respect to all their friends.
The problem with much of the existing work in this area is that the underlying
assumption that members of the same community will be treated similarly has not been
adequately examined empirically. This assumption depends heavily on the goodness
of fit between a user's conception of their audience and the communities created by
the algorithm. Moreover, most of these works implement only one algorithm for their
experiments and a comparison and an evaluation of community detection algorithms in
an access control context is absent. Such a comparison is essential before making any
conclusions about the quality of fit that the communities created by the algorithms may
have with access control decisions made by users. The analysis presented in Chapter
5 of this thesis shows a detailed empirical evaluation conducted to identify the best
among 8 popular network based community detection algorithms in terms of a goodness
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of fit with access control decisions made by social media users. This analysis enables
the identification of the most appropriate community detection algorithm to be used to
represent relationship type in the access control recommendation mechanism presented
in this thesis.
Alternative to using network based community detection, profile information may
also be used to create communities in the friend networks of social media users [AFW12].
Indeed, as mentioned earlier in this chapter when describing the evaluation of social media
infrastructure (Section 2.2), there is a shift towards better representation of relationships
in mainstream social media sites such as Facebook and Google+ who have made an effort
to enable users to represent their interpersonal relationships into communities by creating
Lists 7 and Circles [KBHC12] respectively. For the recommendation mechanism presented
in this thesis, only network based community detection algorithms were evaluated to
represent relationship type as profile information is considered to represent strength
of relationships (discussed later in this section). Thus, in this way, the access control
recommendation mechanism considers both the network structure (in the form of network
based community detection) as well as the appropriate profile information to represent
the type and strength of relationships between individuals.
2.3.2 Relationship Strength
Users often provide a lot of information about themselves in the profiles they create
on some social media sites such as Facebook. Of course, the extent and nature of the
information provided depends on the particular social media site. This profile information
can be used to inform and enhance access control mechanisms. One particular method
of using profile information is by calculating similarity between users' profiles which
can be used as a proxy for the strength of their relationship or the ``closeness"" between
them [ML12, SKLD14, LLWG11, FSEGF14, ACF12]. This closeness can then be used
to inform access control decisions making [FSEGF14, SKLD14].
The success of access control recommendation mechanisms relying on profile infor-
7https://en-gb.facebook.com/help/135312293276793/
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mation depends on several factors. The effectiveness of profile based mechanisms can
suffer due to missing information which can happen due to the users not providing
information for certain attributes such as ``religion"", ``relationship status"", ``political
affiliation"", ``age"", etc., as they may consider them to be sensitive [AFW12]. This would
compromise the accuracy of the calculation of ``closeness"" and the subsequent access con-
trol recommendation as a result. When providing dynamic assistance, the time required
to fetch the required information from the profiles of a user's friends also needs to be
kept to a minimum. Additionally, profile attributes which require personal information
(such as personal communication, identifying information such as location, relationship
status, etc.) may be considered sensitive by the user and can have privacy implications
as a result. Hence, employing them in an attempt to safeguard privacy is obviously not
ideal. Moreover, to create a solution which can be used across all platforms, the validity
of the profile attributes across platforms needs to be considered as well. Considering
platform specific attributes will not result in a holistic solution. Thus, achieving desir-
able results with profile attribute based mechanisms depends heavily on the choice of
profile attributes. Chapter 6 presents detailed results of an empirical evaluation of 30
potential profile attributes which could be used to represent relationship strength in
an access control recommendation mechanism. The findings of the evaluation enable
the identification of the minimal subset of attributes which can represent relationship
strength while overcoming the discussed challenges associated with profile information
based mechanisms.
2.3.3 Content
In addition to the ``who"", determined by social relationships, the ``what"", in terms of
information about the content, also needs to be considered to make informed access
control decisions [SSLW11, KLM+12]. Social media users share text and multimedia on
social media sites and can provide a lot of useful metadata in the form of tags [LGZ08].
They have been found to annotate a lot of the information they post on social media
sites to express various emotions, provide topical cues, target content to other users,
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etc. [MNBD06]. Such manually provided tags are also found to be very valuable for
recommending relevant content to social media users [GZR+10]. More pertinently for
the work presented in this thesis, it has also been shown that such manually provided
tags can be used to create access control policies in a way which is considered minimally
intrusive for users [YKGS09, KLM+12].
An alternative method to manual tags is to employ tools to automatically analyze
the content and classify or categorize it to leverage this classification to inform access
control decisions [SSLW11, SLSW15]. Such automatic classification can be beneficial as
it removes the burden of annotating content from the user. However, it also means that
the mechanism needs to analyze the content which can create a computational overhead.
The computational complexity will of course depend on the nature and the amount of the
content being posted. For example, the accuracy of image classification may be different
to the analysis of text updates and mechanisms need to be in place which can handle
multiple types of content being posted. Moreover, such analysis has to be performed
in real-time in order to provide dynamic access control recommendations to the user.
Another possible stumbling block associated with automated analysis of content is that
such approaches require access to the content being posted. Mechanisms relying on the
user to provide tags do not require to access and process the content itself and hence
can be absolved of any privacy implications emanating from accessing it. Processing and
analyzing the content being shared by social media users in order to recommend access
control policies may lead to other privacy problems, especially from an ``institutional
privacy"" perspective if the mechanism is part of the social media infrastructure itself.
2.3.4 Summary and Challenges Addressed by this Thesis
This section has discussed the previous works which focus on learning and recommending
access control decisions to social media users by leveraging social relationships and the
information about the content being shared. Table 2.2 summarizes these works according
to the types of information they leveraged. It can be clearly seen that there is an absence
of a holistic approach that combines all these types of information together to accurately
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Table 2.2: The type of attributes which were considered by previous research
Relationship Relationship Content
Type Strength
Amershi et al. [AFW12] \ding{54} \ding{52} \ding{54}
Cheek et al. [CS14] \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54}
Danezis [Dan09] \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54}
Fang et al. [FL10] \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
Jones et al. [JO10] \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54}
Li et al. [LLWG11] \ding{54} \ding{52} \ding{54}
McAuley et al. [ML12] \ding{54} \ding{52} \ding{54}
Misra et al. [MS16] \ding{54} \ding{52} \ding{54}
Squicciarini et al. [SKLD14] \ding{54} \ding{52} \ding{52}
Squicciarini et al. [SLSW15] \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{52}
Squicciarini et al. [SSLW11] \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{52}
Yildiz et al. [YK12] \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{52}
represent the overall context of information disclosure.
The primary contribution of this thesis is an access control recommendation mecha-
nism, REACT, which is aimed towards filling this important gap by providing accurate
access control recommendations which can be adapted to formulate a desired access con-
trol policy which can preserve the ``contextual integrity"" of the information being shared
by the user. REACT uses information which helps in defining the type and strength of
interpersonal relationships between users in conjunction with the information about the
content to provide ``allow""/``deny"" type access control recommendations to social media
users. However, as shown later in this thesis, while using all three types of information, it
actually requires fewer attributes, and hence less information, when compared to previous
approaches. Moreover, it is also shown that the attributes required by REACT are also




This chapter describes the overall design and the different components of REACT, an
access control recommendation mechanism which leverages the type and strength of
interpersonal relationships and information about the content to recommend access
control decisions to the users.
Learning from access control decisions made by social media users and providing
recommendations is an established method of trying to assist them by easing the burden
of having to make appropriate access control decisions. For any such mechanism to
be useful to the users, it is important to consider the social context of the information
disclosure in order to provide meaningful access control recommendations which preserve
the ``contextual integrity"" of the information [MS16]. The social context of the information
disclosure can be derived from the interpersonal relationships between the sharer and
the audience of the content. These interpersonal relationships can be defined in terms
of their type (friend, family, etc.) as well as the strength or closeness (close friend,
acquaintance, etc.). These factors are often considered important by the social media
users when making access control decisions about information they share on the social
media site [Fon11a]. In addition to the ``who"" in terms of the potential audience of the
content and the users' relationship with them, the ``what"", the content itself, has an
impact on the access control policy. For example, a person may not feel comfortable in
sharing intimate details about embarrassing events with a person in their friend network
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Figure 3.1: Various components of REACT
but might share mundane details with them. Thus, the nature of the content has an
impact on the user's desired access control policy in terms of selecting an appropriate
audience [SLSW15]. Therefore, in order to completely represent the overall context of the
information disclosure, information about the content being shared needs to be considered
in conjunction with information enabling definition of interpersonal relationships with
respect to type and strength.
Figure 3.1 depicts REACT and the components it uses to make access control
recommendations to the users. It has three components to account for the three types of
information it uses to produce these ``allow""/``deny"" type access control recommendations
to the user. The Relationship Type is represented by community membership of each
friend which denotes which community, created by the community detection algorithm,
they belong to [FL10]. The Relationship Strength is represented by similarity of profile
attributes which denotes ``closeness"" between individuals [AFW12, ML12]. REACT
considers the representation of the Content in the form of categories or ``tags"". As
shown in the figure, REACT also leverages ``blacklisted friends"" in order to minimize
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the burden on the users as it only produces access control recommendations for the
non-blacklisted friends. The rest of this chapter discusses the different components of
REACT individually.
3.1 Components
This section introduces these different components of REACT and discusses why they
are important to the design of REACT. The specific details about implementing each of
the components is described in detail in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
3.1.1 Relationship Type
Social media users have vast friend networks of people who they connect with and may
or may not know in real life [JEB12]. This means that they share different types of
relationships (such as friends, colleagues, family, acquaintances, etc.) with members
in their network. It is important to acknowledge this variation in the relationships
between users and members in their friend network as it does have an influence on the
access control behavior. For instance, users may be comfortable in sharing work related
information with their office colleagues but not personal events which they may feel
comfortable only sharing with their close friends or family.
REACT uses community membership to represent relationship type between a user and
each of their friends. To do so, it requires the social network of the user, often represented
as a graph of ``nodes"" representing each of the user's friends and ``edges"" which represent
the connections between them. REACT takes a network-based approach to partition
the social network graph into substructures called ``cliques"" or communities [PKVS12].
Figure 3.2 shows an example of a friend network before and after the use of community
detection algorithms. The communities that are produced from the friend network will
not be directly used by the users while making access control decisions but only leveraged
by REACT as an attribute (community membership of each friend of the user) in its
mechanism to recommend access control decisions to them (refer Figure 3.1). Most
community detection algorithms partition the network such that the connections between
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(a) Friend Network without communities (b) Friend Network after community detection
Figure 3.2: Friend network shown before and after community detection using Clique Percolation
Method [DPV05]
members within a community are more than the connections between members of different
communities [PKVS12].
Network-based community detection is an extensively researched problem and has led
to the development of many algorithms [PKVS12]. In such a scenario, it is essential to
identify the community detection algorithm which is best suited to be used to represent
relationship type in an access control recommendation mechanism such as REACT.
Chapter 5 presents a detailed empirical evaluation of 8 well known community detection
algorithms by examining a goodness of fit of the communities produced by the algorithms
with the access control decisions made by users. More details about the community
detection process as well as different types of network based community detection
algorithms are also discussed there.
3.1.2 Relationship Strength
Social media profiles often contain a variety of information such as personal details,
number of friends, photos, etc. The similarity in profile information of individuals can
be used to calculate ``closeness"" or strength of the relationship between them [GK09].
Interpersonal communication such as messages, comments or posts can also be assimilated
for this purpose. This relationship strength can be leveraged to inform users about the
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access control decisions they make while disclosing the information on the social media
sites [FSEGF14] due to the known interplay between relationship strength and access
control decisions [WKC+11]. However, there are several challenges when using profile
information in any access control enhancing mechanism:
\bullet Many users leave profile attributes blank or set privacy controls so they cannot be
retrieved
\bullet There is a huge amount of potential attributes to be used and the associated time
to fetch and analyze them needs to be minimal
\bullet Some of the attributes could be seen as too privacy intrusive (e.g. entire conversa-
tions exchanged between users) to be used precisely to improve privacy and access
control
\bullet Some of the attributes are dependent on the specific social media platform.
Looking at these challenges, it seems imperative to identify the most suitable subset
of profile attributes which can be used to represent relationship strength or closeness
between individuals. To the best of my knowledge, such a systematic evaluation is
missing in literature. Chapter 6 of this thesis presents a detailed empirical study of
profile attributes which can be used to represent relationship strength and identifies a
minimal subset of attributes which are used in REACT for this purpose.
3.1.3 Content
The design of REACT is agnostic to the type of content being shared, and it considers
all ``tags"" or information about the content available, whether manually provided by
users or automatically inferred by tools. REACT can easily be adapted to the type of
content or indeed the method used to provide information about the content (manual or
automatic) depending on the particular implementation of the design. Modern social
media sites often afford the users the opportunity to provide such information through
tags and research has shown that users often enhance the content by providing additional
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topical information through them [MNBD06]. Moreover, it has also been found that such
manually provided ``tags"" are a minimally disruptive experience for the users [YKGS09].
These tags can be about the topic of the content (e.g., Flickr has a list of potential topic
categories for the photos users upload) or further information about the social context
(e.g., friends being tagged in photos or mentions being made to them in text posts).
Topical tags, which help in categorizing the content, as well as social tags (friends being
tagged) can help define the content and further contribute to the context of the disclosure
and hence enhance access control recommendation.
An alternative method to manually tagging content is to use tools to automatically
infer information about the content [KST+08, SSLW11]. This can depend on the type
of information being shared and the techniques would vary (for e.g. natural language
processing for text or image processing techniques for photos). Both approaches, manual
tagging and automatic analysis of content, have their advantages and disadvantages.
While automatic analysis of content absolves the user of the responsibility of providing
the information about the content, hence removing the burden off them, it may not
accurately represent the users' idea of the content. Moreover, it would also necessitate
the mechanism to access the content itself which may have privacy implications for the
user. Facebook, for example, uses face-recognition techniques to automatically suggest
social tags to users in the photos they upload on the site [ZSM11]. While such algorithms
may work for social tags, depending on their accuracy, it has been found that users often
interpret categories differently and automatic categorizing of photos into categories or
topics may not be aligned with their notion of the content [LHY+09].
3.1.4 Blacklisted Friends
Social media users often have vast friend networks consisting of many friends. However,
it has been empirically found that social media users often intend to share their content
with a limited subset of their entire friend network [KBHC12, MO11]. REACT leverages
this intuition by maintaining a ``blacklist"" of friends for each user. These blacklisted
friends can be assigned a default ``deny"" access control recommendation. Note that the
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specific number of blacklisted friends depends on various factors for individual users
such as their access control behavior and their network size. Different social media users
use the medium differently and their access control behavior and patterns are driven
by their privacy preferences and their intentions [MO11]. For example, some users may
want to use social media as a ``broadcast medium"" and connect to and interact with as
many people as possible. For these users, the number of friends in the blacklist would be
minimal. Alternatively, users may choose to interact with only a small subset of their
friends and the blacklist for these users may contain a majority of their friends. Thus,
the blacklist construction in REACT is a personalized and dynamic process in which a
blacklist is learned based on previous access controls decisions and, hence, it entirely
depends on the preferences and access control behavior of individual users.
3.2 Example
In this section, a minimal example scenario is described where the information representing
the type and strength of relationships is used in conjunction with the category of the
content by REACT in order to provide access control recommendations to the user.
Figure 3.3 shows a user Alice who has 5 friends, namely, Bob, Charlie, Dan, Eve and
John. In Figure 3.3a, it can be seen that REACT produces two types of relationships
between Alice and her friends after the community detection process. Charlie and John
belong to the ``Family"" community while Bob, Dan and Eve are ``Friends"".
Figure 3.3b shows the strength of relationships between Alice and all of her friends
which would be computed by REACT after processing the relevant profile attributes.
Bob and Charlie are seen to be sharing a ``strong"" relationship with Alice while her
relationship with John is seen to be ``weak"".
3.2.1 Access Control Scenario
Given the attributes related to relationship type and strength just described, it is
important to understand how REACT would recommend access control decisions to





Figure 3.3: The type and strength of relationships Alice has with her friends
share a photo about a party she had with friends. This photo may contain some privacy
implication as she may not want to reveal to everyone in her friend network that she
got drunk at the party. While sharing this photo through REACT, she categorizes it as
``Party"" and ``Personal"". REACT has learned from the previous access control decisions
made by Alice that she only shares photos showing her in parties with people who are
``close"" to her but not with any members of her family.
It is clear that John, Dan and Eve will not be recommended an ``allow"" decision
as none of them have a ``strong"" relationship with Alice (refer Figure 3.3b). Charlie,
while having a ``strong"" relationship with Alice, is a family member (Figure 3.3a) and
hence will be recommended a ``deny"" decision as well. This leaves only Bob who shares a
``strong"" relationship with Alice while not being a family member and will therefore be
recommended an ``allow"" decision as shown in Figure 3.4. It is important to note that
none of the 5 friends shown in this example were blacklisted based on previous decisions
made by Alice and hence REACT had to provide access control recommendations for
each one of them. This example illustrates how REACT considers the relationship type
and strength between Alice and each of the members of her friend network in conjunction




Figure 3.4: Access control recommendations made by REACT for each of Alice's friends
3.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the overall design and the different components of REACT which
leverages interpersonal relationships between the users and members of their friend net-
work as well as information about the content being shared to recommend ``allow""/``deny""
type access control decisions. It also demonstrated a minimal example which described a
simplified representation of how REACT can assist users by making access control recom-
mendations by processing the relevant information about the interpersonal relationships
and the content being shared. Chapter 4 presents the user study which was conducted to
obtain the ground truth dataset of access control decisions made by social media users as
well as the relevant information for the different components of REACT (relationship
defining information as well as information about the content) in order to evaluate the
performance of REACT. Chapter 5 presents the empirical study conducted to identify
the most appropriate community detection algorithm to represent relationship type in
REACT while Chapter 6 presents the empirical study conducted to identify the most
suitable subset of profile attributes used by REACT to represent relationship strength.
The results of the evaluation and the description of the particular implementation of




The primary contribution of the work done in this thesis is an access control recommenda-
tion mechanism, REACT, the design of which was presented in the previous chapter. In
order to understand whether REACT would be useful to social media users, it needed to
be evaluated in an actual access control scenario. Obtaining ground truth access control
decisions to evaluate access control mechanisms is a challenging task in itself and is further
complicated when information from social media profiles is required [AFW12], as in the
case of REACT in order to represent relationship strength. Conducting user studies are
an established method of evaluating access control mechanisms [FL10, AFW12, SSLW11].
However, there have been several previous studies in which users were not required to
make access control decisions but the evaluations relied on either qualitative feedback
of using the mechanism [AFW12] or actions made by the user which were not in an
access control scenario (e.g., creating groups to evaluate community detection algorithm
without any given context) [FSEGF14]. It was considered important to evaluate REACT
in an actual access control scenario where users would make access control decisions while
disclosing information. There was an absence of a public dataset of such ground truth
access control decisions and the information required to create the attributes necessary
for the decision making mechanism of REACT and hence a user study was necessary to
provide a thorough evaluation of the various components of REACT.
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4.1 Experiment
The user study was conducted in one of the laboratories in the School of Computing
and Communications at Lancaster University. The participants were required to use
a Facebook application specifically designed and developed for this experiment. This
application, and all the data collected during the course of the study, was stored on a
secure server. The experiment was piloted by asking 4 colleagues to participate with the
aim of ironing out any issues with the design of the application. This was an important
phase as it led to minor alterations to the design of the database, which was storing the
user data to be collected during the user study, making it easier to eventually analyze the
information collected during the actual study. The pilot phase also reaffirmed that the
application could handle simultaneous participation of multiple users without adversely
affecting the integrity of the collected data. All data collected during the pilot phase was
discarded before the commencement of the experiment with the actual participants.
The experiment was conducted after an ethical review by the Research Ethics Commit-
tee of Lancaster University. The review process required the submission of a description
of the experiment, an information sheet which would be provided to the participants as
well as consent forms which would be signed by participants prior to commencing their
participation in the user study. The ethical review was an interactive process and the
Ethics Committee asked for minor clarifications about the motivations of the user study
which were duly communicated to them and which helped to improve the information
sheet handed to participants (shown in Appendix A). The participants were informed
a-priori that the experiment was being conducted in a simulated environment and none
of their activity during the study would get uploaded to Facebook or affect their profiles
in any way. They were, however, encouraged to make their access control decisions as if
that was the case, i.e., if the photos were to end up being shared on Facebook. Each
user provided informed consent before commencing their participation in the user study
(consent form shown in Appendix B). The application created for the user study used
Facebook Query Language (FQL) and the Facebook Graph API to interact with the
Facebook databases. The application was kept alive for a duration of 5 days (in April
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2015) during which the user study was completed.
In addition to accessing the users' profile data as well as the profile data of their
friends, the application also downloaded five randomly chosen photos from each user's
Facebook profiles. These photos were downloaded in order to be shown to the user during
the study for them to make access control decisions. In addition, the participants were
asked to select and bring 5 other photos which they had not yet uploaded on Facebook.
This was done to avoid a scenario where a user makes access control decisions for all
photos during the study for which they had already received comments and likes before
as that may have influenced their decisions. Therefore, we wanted them to make some
access control decisions about content they had never previously shared on Facebook.
The participants were also advised to bring photos which they considered to be personal
(either included them or a family member) or considered sensitive so that they had a
privacy implication. The different stages of the user study were:
1. The participants logged into the application using their Facebook credentials. They
were then alerted about the data that would be accessed and asked for explicit
permissions before moving on.
2. The participants were shown 10 photos (5 from Facebook and 5 they brought as
detailed earlier) sequentially on the screen, each on an individual page. They were
asked to select categories for the photos from a predefined list of 15 popular photo
categories (taken from Flickr, shown in Figure 4.1a). They were also given the
opportunity to tag any friends in the particular photo (Figure 4.1b).
3. Once they had selected categories and tagged their friends, the users were asked
to select each friend who they wanted to disclose the photo to (Figure 4.2). The
friend list was shown alphabetically to the participants to imitate the organization
Facebook uses to show friend lists to its users. They were explicitly told that any
friend who was not selected would be denied access to the photo. All the selections
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(a) Selection of category
(b) Selecting friends to tag (faces and parts of names hidden to safeguard privacy of people
appearing in the photos)
Figure 4.1: Selecting categories and tagging friends
45
Chapter 4: User Study
Figure 4.2: Selecting an audience for the photo (faces and parts of names hidden to safeguard
privacy of people appearing in the photos)
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made by the users for each of the 10 photos were stored in the database.
While the users were completing the above mentioned process, the application fetched
their friend network and the profile information for each of their friends. The friend
network was used as input to the Community Detection process which was performed
for each user after the completion of the study. The profile information of each of their
friends was later converted to generate the relevant Profile Attributes for our analysis
presented in Chapter 6. The Photo Categories were selected by the users during the
process as mentioned. In addition to the categories, the Tagged Friends were also recorded
to complete the information about the content.
4.2 Participants
The eventual sample considered for the analyses presented in this thesis consisted of
26 participants. The participants were recruited primarily from among the staff and
students of Lancaster University. Additionally, there were some participants who were
external to the university and were invited through personal communication channels
such as email, social networks, etc. Details about the privacy implications and the overall
objectives of the experiment were communicated to the registered participants and it
was conducted only after the explicit consent of the participants. All participants were
compensated with \$10 for their involvement in the study.
Typical pre- and post-experiment checks were performed after completion of the user
study in order to maximize data quality. In particular, before the experiment participants
were screened and everyone who had a Facebook account having 100 friends and had
uploaded at least 10 photos before the study was invited to participate in the user study.
After an initial registration phase where the participants expressed their interest in being
involved in the study, 31 participants were selected to take part.
After completion of the user study, 4 participants were identified who had granted
access to groups of alphabetically sorted friends for each photo. These groups were
different for each photo and it seems that these participants just randomly scrolled to
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Age No. of Friends
Average 29 265




Table 4.1: Demographic details of participants
a section of their friend list and granted access to consecutively listed friends. There
was another participant who granted access to 1 friend for each photo but it was a
different friend each time. As the participants were explained that they were to make
access control decisions and that the friends who they were not selecting would be denied
access to the information, it is implausible that a user would grant access to only one
friend and it would be a different friend each time. It was concluded that the access
control decisions made by these 5 participants were not according to the directions of
the user study. The data collected from the participation of the remaining 26 users has
been considered to produce the results reported in this thesis. The 26 users which were
considered for the analyses consisted of 15 males (57.7\%) and 11 females (42.3\%). The
details of the participants' age and size of friend network are shown in Table 4.1. We
find that the average age of the participants was 29 years (s.d = 6) and the average size
of network was 265 friends (s.d = 121).
4.3 Dataset
The user study was conducted with the dual aim of obtaining the relevant information
to implement the different components of REACT (described in Chapter 3) as well
as gathering the ground truth access control decisions to evaluate the access control
recommendations made by it. This section provides a description of the data that was
collected during the user study and how the different components were represented.
As discussed earlier in Section 4.1, each participant had to make access control
decisions with respect to each of their friends for 10 photos, one after the other. There
were 26 participants who made access control decisions for 6884 friends in total. The total
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Figure 4.3: Representation of a particular instance in the dataset
number of access control decisions made by all participants during the user study, and
therefore the size of the ground truth dataset, was 68,840 access control decisions.
Each instance in the dataset represented information required to create attributes
representing the different components of REACT (which were shown in Figure 3.1 in
Chapter 3) as well as the ground truth access control decision made by the user during
the user study. An illustration of how each instance was represented in the dataset is
shown in Figure 4.3.
Relationship Type is represented using community membership in REACT. To create
communities for each user, their friend networks were used as input to the community
detection process. In this way, each and every friend of a particular user was assigned
a community membership which constitutes the relationship type information in each
instance as shown in Figure 4.3. More details about the choice of the particular community
detection algorithm are provided in Chapter 5 where an empirical study is described.
That study compares 8 popular community detection algorithms and chooses the best
performing algorithm which is then used to implement relationship type in REACT.
The implementation of the community detection algorithm and the representation of
community membership is discussed in more detail in Section 7.1 of Chapter 7 alongside
the implementation of other components of REACT.
The Relationship Strength information shown in Figure 4.3 contains the profile
attributes chosen to represent the strength of the relationship between a user and a
particular friend. To identify the most suitable set of profile attributes for this purpose, all
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No. Category Number of Photos Order
1 People (Friends) 69 3
2 Personal 60 14
3 Travel 54 6
4 Entertainment 51 13
5 Event 35 9
6 Humor 22 10
7 Landscape 21 1
8 Architecture 20 4
9 People (Others) 14 2
10 Food 13 11
11 Animals 11 5
12 Fashion 6 7
13 Technology 6 15
14 Advertising 4 12
15 Celebrity 3 8
Table 4.2: Number of photos from each category as selected by the participants
available profile data of each of the participants' friends was downloaded during the user
study and analyzed. Due to the API restrictions imposed by Facebook (discussed in more
detail in Chapter 6), the number of friends for whom all profile attributes were available
was less than the total 6884 friends. The analysis of profile attributes is described in
detail in Chapter 6.
For the Content information in REACT, the participants were mandated to select at
least one category from a list of 15 predefined categories during the experiment. They
were given the option of selecting more than one category for a photo if applicable. Table
4.2 shows the number of photos in each category as selected by the participants during
the study. The ``order"" in the last column shows the order in which they appeared on
the list shown to the participants. It is quite clear that the order had no effect on the
participants' selections as ``Personal"" and ``Entertainment"" appeared low on the list but
were selected for many photos by the users as shown in the table. Overall, it can be
seen that ``People (Friends)"", ``Personal"", ``Travel"" and ``Entertainment"" were the most
selected categories whereas ``Advertising"" and ``Celebrity"" had the lowest number of
photos. An important observation here is that the total number of photos, adding up
the numbers in column 3, is 389 which is much more than the 260 photos shown to the
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participants. This is due to the fact that the participants were able to select multiple
categories for the photos as was discussed earlier in Section 4.1.
The participants were also given the opportunity of ``tagging"" any of their friends
in the photos during the study. The collected data shows that out of the 260 photos
shown to the participants, there were 122 (46.9\%) photos where the participant tagged
at least one friend. There were 4 participants who did not tag any friends in any of their
10 photos. On the other hand, 4 out of the 26 participants tagged at least one friend in
each of their 10 photos.
Therefore, the content information shown in Figure 4.3 includes the attributes
representing the categories of the particular photo as selected by the user during the
experiment as well as any social tag made by them.
In addition to information representing each of the components of REACT, the
instances in the dataset also included the ground truth access control decisions made by
the user during the study (refer to Figure 4.3). These decisions were used to evaluate the
performance of the classifier which was trained using the attributes representing each
component of REACT. This evaluation and the results are described in detail in Chapter
7 of this thesis.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the details of the user study which was conducted in order to enable
evaluation of REACT in an actual access control scenario. The experiment was designed
to obtain ground truth access control decisions made by users, their friend networks,
to create attributes to represent relationship type, profile information of the users and
their friends, to create attributes to represent relationship strength, and annotations
representing the photo categories and social tags, to represent information about the
content in the implementation of REACT. During the experiment, 26 participants made
access control decisions corresponding to each member in their friend network for 10





Chapter 3 showed the design of REACT where it was described that the relationship
type component uses community membership. In order for REACT to provide accurate
access control recommendations, it is essential to identify the most suitable community
detection algorithm which can be used to represent relationship type in an access control
scenario. This chapter presents the findings of an empirical evaluation of 8 popular
network based community detection algorithms with the aim of finding the most suitable
algorithm which has the best fit with access control decisions made by users.
There have been a number of works that proposed using community detection
algorithms to facilitate the definition of access control policies [CS14, JO10, Dan09, FL10].
The problem with much of the existing work in leveraging communities for access control
mechanisms, however, is that the underlying assumption that members of the same
community will be treated similarly has not been adequately examined empirically.
This assumption depends heavily on the goodness of fit between a user's conception of
their audience and the communities created by the algorithm. Moreover, most of these
works implement only one algorithm for their experiments and a comparison and an
evaluation of community detection algorithms in an access control context is absent.
Such a comparison is essential before making any conclusions about the quality of fit
between communities created by the algorithms and the access control decisions made
by users. Fogu\'es, et al. [FSEGF14] did test three community detection algorithms,
52
Chapter 5: Relationship Type
but the algorithms were compared in terms of whether the communities created would
be accepted as such by users, not in terms of their direct goodness of fit with access
control decisions which is crucial to help automate recommendations as much as possible.
The empirical evaluation presented in this chapter examines 8 popular network based
community detection algorithms in order to identify the algorithm which has the best fit
with access control decisions made by social media users.
5.1 Algorithms Considered
Network based community detection algorithms require the friend network (friends as
nodes and connections as edges) as input and produce communities as an output. Such
algorithms have been categorized by Papadopoulos, et al. [PKVS12] into the following
types depending on their methodology:
1. Cohesive Subgraph Discovery - This method involves dividing the network into
subgraphs. Generally, the structure of these subgraphs is known a-priori. Some of
these structures are cliques, n-cliques, k-cores, LS sets and lambda sets [PKVS12].
Algorithms for enumerating such structures, such as the Bron-Kerbosch algorithm
[BK73] and the efficient k-core decomposition algorithm of Batagelj and Zaversnik
[BZ03] belong in this category. In addition, methods such as the Clique Percolation
Method [PDFV05] and the SCAN algorithm [XYF+07] which lead to the discovery
of subgraph structures with well-specified properties fall in the same category.
2. Vertex Clustering - A typical means of casting a graph vertex clustering problem to
one that can be solved by conventional data clustering methods (such as k-means
and hierarchical agglomerative clustering) is by embedding graph vertices in a
vector space, where pairwise distances between vertices can be calculated. Another
popular method is to use the spectrum of the graph for mapping graph vertices
to points in a low-dimensional space, where the cluster structure is more pro-
found [DM04]. Other vertex similarity measures such as the structural equivalence
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[BBA75] and the neighborhood overlap have been used to compute similarities
between graph vertices [Was94]. A different method, called Walktrap [PL05] makes
use of a random-walk based similarity between vertices and between communities
and uses modularity in a hierarchical agglomerative clustering scheme to derive an
optimal vertex clustering structure.
3. Community Quality Optimization - There are a very large number of methods that
are founded on the basis of optimizing some graph-based measure of community
quality. Subgraph density and cut-based measures, such as normalized cut [SM00]
and conductance [KVV04] are some early examples of this approach. The seminal
``greedy optimization technique"" of Newman [NG04] and speeded up versions of it,
such as max-heap based agglomeration [CNM04] and iterative heuristic schemes
[BGLL08] are all related to measuring modularity in networks and using it as a
metric for dividing the network into groups or communities. A relatively sophisti-
cated method based on ``extremal"" optimization by Arena, et al. [DA05] is worth a
mention in this category as well.
4. Divisive Algorithms - This method aims to find relatively disconnected components
of the network and create communities such that edges between these communities
are reduced. The algorithm by Girvan and Newman [GN02] is an example of this
approach and it progressively removes the edges of a network based on some edge
betweeness measure until communities emerge as disconnected components of the
graph. Several measures of edge betweeness have been devised, for instance, edge,
random-walk, and current-flow betweeness [NG04], as well as information centrality
[FLM04] and the edge clustering coefficient [RCC+04]. Finally, min-cut/max-flow
methods [FLG00, IKN05] adopt a different divisive perspective: they try to identify
graph cuts (i.e. sets of edges that separate the graph in pieces) that have a minimum
size.
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Table 5.1: List of network based community detection algorithms evaluated
Algorithm Type Complexity
FastGreedy (FG) Community Quality Optim. O(n log2 n)
Walktrap (WT) Vertex Clustering O(n2 log n)
Infomap (IM) Model Based O(n log n)
Girvan-Newman (GVN) Divisive O(n3)
Label Propagation (LP) Model Based O(n)
Leading Eigenvector (LEV) Community Quality Optim. O(n2 log n)
Multi-level Community (MC) Community Quality Optim. O(n)
Clique-Percolation (CP) Cohesive Subgraph Discovery O(exp(n))
5. Model based Algorithms - A broad category of methods that either consider a
dynamic process taking place on the network, which reveals its communities, or
consider an underlying model of statistical nature that can generate the division of
the network into communities. Examples of dynamic processes are label propagation
[RAK07, LHLC09, Gre10], synchronization of Kuramoto oscillators [ADGPV06],
diffusion flow, better known as Markov Cluster Algorithm, and the popular spin
model by Reichardt and Bornholdt [RB06]. Other model-based approaches rely on
the principle that a good clustering is determined by a low encoding cost, thus they
perform community detection by finding the cluster structure that results in the
lowest possible cluster encoding cost [Cha04, RB08].
Table 5.1 lists the 8 community detection algorithms which are evaluated in this
chapter. The complexity of the different algorithms as shown in the table are obtained
from [PKVS12] and [For10].
5.2 Goodness of Fit Metrics
Three metrics were employed in order to examine a goodness of fit between communities
produced by the algorithms and the access control decisions made by users. The metrics
are defined such that they acknowledge the willingness of users to share selectively in
communities [KBHC12] but also account for the effort required from the user to modify
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the communities into an audience for their content [FSEGF14].
5.2.1 Number of Communities per Audience
Intuitively, an algorithm is considered more useful if the user needs to select from a small
number of communities to build the entire audience for a photo. Thus, the algorithm
with a low average number of communities to complete an audience is considered a better
fit for audience selection.
Definition 1. Given the set of friends U , the set of communities \BbbC , the particular photo
p, and the audience for the photo Ap, the number of communities per audience is:
Gp = | \{ C | C \in \BbbC \wedge \exists u \in Ap, u \in C\} | 
For example, if a user selects 50 members in an audience for a particular photo and
18 are from community A, 22 from community B and the other 10 from community C
according to the communities created by the Fastgreedy algorithm, the value for this
metric will be 3 (as 3 communities are represented in the audience) for Fastgreedy for
that particular photo.
5.2.2 Ratio of audience in largest community
If the communities produced by an algorithm can be readily used to create an audience,
then the burden on the user is minimized. Thus, we calculate the percentage of audience
members belonging to the largest community represented in the audience.
Definition 2. Given the set of friends U , the set of communities \BbbC , the particular photo
p, and the audience for the photo Ap, the ratio of audience in largest community is:
Rp =
maxC\in \BbbC | \{ u | u \in Ap \wedge u \in C\} | 
| Ap| 
The ratio is represented as a percentage of the total number of friends in the audience.
For example, if a user selects an audience of 50 friends and 18 of them are from community
A, we would calculate the ratio as 36\% (18/50).
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5.2.3 Penalty for Exclusion
When the user is employing the communities produced by the algorithms for audience
selection, it is possible (and probable) that he would need to exclude some of the friends
from some of the communities to create an audience of his choice. After all, community
membership does not guarantee that all friends in the same community would always be
treated in a similar way by the user. Such an exclusion from an audience will require
effort from the user. Thus, the algorithms need to be evaluated with a metric that
measures the number of friends in a given community who were not included in the
audience for a particular photo.
Definition 3. Given the set of friends U , the set of communities \BbbC , the particular photo




| \{ u | u /\in Ap \wedge u \in C \wedge \exists u2 \in Ap, u \not = u2 \wedge u2 \in C\} | 
Consider the example used to describe Definition 1, where the user selects 18 audience
members from community A, 22 from community B and 10 from community C to select
a total audience of 50 friends. Suppose community A has 30 total members, B has 25
and C has 10. This would mean that the user would have to manually exclude 12 (30-18)
members from community A and 3 (25-22) from community B to achieve the desired
audience. Thus, the total penalty for exclusion for selecting such an audience would be 15
(12+3). Note that there is no penalty corresponding to community C as the user selected
all 10 of its members in the audience. The penalty is calculated using the equation in
Definition 3 as a summation of all those friends who would have to be excluded by the
user after selecting their entire community as an audience. Intuitively, a lower penalty
value means that the communities provided by the algorithm has a better fit with the
access control decisions made by the users.
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5.3 Results
The 8 algorithms which are evaluated in this chapter were implemented using iGraph
[CN06] and SNAP libraries [LS14]. The communities were created using each of the
algorithms for each user from their friend networks which were downloaded during the
user study (described in Chapter 4) as a list of ``nodes"" representing each friend and
``edges"" representing links between them. The goodness of fit between the communities
created by each of the algorithms and the ground truth dataset of 68,840 access control
decisions obtained during the user study was evaluated using the metrics described earlier.
5.3.1 Overall Results
For the results discussed in this chapter, the value of each metric is averaged across 10
photos for each individual user and then aggregated for all users for each algorithm.
Communities per Audience
From the results in Fig 5.1, it is clear that Clique Percolation Method (CP) performs
slightly better than the other algorithms. The results indicate that a user needs to
traverse through less than 4 communities (3.42) on average to complete their audience
selection if using the communities produced by CP. Multilevel (3.86), Leading Eigenvector
(4.08), Label Propagation (4.15) and Fastgreedy (4.35) produce communities such that
a user may need to access less than 5 communities to complete the audience. Infomap
produces the least impressive performance with respect to this metric (6.49).
In order to understand whether the dataset followed a normal distribution or not,
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS Test) [Lil67] was conducted. It was found that the
dataset was significantly deviant from normal distribution (p < .001). This meant
that an ANOVA test was not possible in order to examine any statistically significant
difference in the performance of the algorithms with respect to the metrics. Therefore, a
Kruskal-Wallis H Test [KW52], which checks for significant difference between treatments
(the 8 community detection algorithms in our case) and does not require the dataset to
be normally distributed, was conducted. For communities per audience, the Kruskal-
58
Chapter 5: Relationship Type
Figure 5.1: Average no. of communities required to create audience for each algorithm
Wallis test showed that there is a significant difference between the algorithms (p < .05).
To identify the source of difference, a Mann-Whitney U Test [MW47] was conducted
and showed that CP performs significantly better than Walktrap, Infomap and Girvan-
Newman. There were no other combinations for which the difference between the
algorithms was statistically significant.
Ratio in Largest Community
Looking at Fig 5.2, it is clear that CP is the best performer compared to all other
algorithms for this metric. On an average, 76.1\% of the audience can be selected from a
single CP community. All other algorithms produce similar performance to each other
where approximately 60\% of the audience can be selected from the same community.
The Kruskal-Wallis test for this metric also showed a significant difference between
the different algorithms (p < .05). The Mann-Whitney U Test revealed that CP had
a significant difference in performance with all other algorithms. None of the other 7
algorithms had a statistically significant difference in performance when compared with
each other.
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Figure 5.2: Average ratio of largest community in audience for each algorithm
Penalty for exclusion
The penalty values in Fig 5.3 signify the average number of friends the user would have
had to exclude to obtain the desired audience from the communities created by the
algorithm. As can be seen from the results, Infomap performs better than all other
algorithm with a penalty value of nearly 122. The highest average penalty, and hence
least desirable performance, is seen for Fastgreedy which produces average penalty value
of 159.292.
Kruskal-Wallis test for penalty for exclusion revealed that there was no significant
difference between the 8 algorithms for this metric (p = 0.850). This can also be antici-
pated by looking at the descriptive statistics shown in Figure 5.3 where the performance
of the algorithms is only marginally different.
5.3.2 Effect of Individual
Having looked at the overall results of our evaluation, aggregated across all users, it was
important to examine whether the individual characteristics of the users had any effect
on the performance of the algorithms. This was done with the objective of trying to see
whether an appropriate algorithm can be chosen with respect to individual users.
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Figure 5.3: Average penalty for exclusion for each algorithm
Personal Characteristics
Table 5.2 shows Pearson correlation for the performance of the algorithms according to
the three evaluation metrics with respect to gender and age of the participants as well as
their size of friends network and average audience size per photo.
It can be seen from the figure that Communities per Audience and Ratio in Largest
Community remain unaffected by Gender, Age and Size of a user's network for all
algorithms. The only characteristic that affects these metrics is the Average Audience
Size. It positively affects the number of communities per audience as expected (more
people, more communities required). On the other hand, it has negative correlation
with ratio of audience in largest community. If a user selects larger audiences, it is
unlikely that the audience will be constituted from a single community or less number
of communities. Looking at penalty for exclusion, age of the user has a weak positive
correlation for all algorithms except CP. Males were coded as `0' and females as `1' for
the binary correlation analysis and hence it can be concluded that males are more likely
to have a higher penalty for exclusion as compared to females. It is also evident that the
size of a user's friend network has strong positive correlation with penalty for exclusion
for all algorithms. Thus, if a user has a large number of friends in their network, they
are more likely to have a higher penalty for exclusion. In terms of particular algorithms,
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Table 5.2: Correlation of performance of algorithms with respect to characteristics of individual





Avg. Audience + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +




Avg. Audience  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Penalty for Exclusion
Gender  - 
Age + + + + + + +
Size +++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ +++
Avg. Audience
Strong Correlation (+ + + or  -  -  - ) : Coefficient> 0.7
Moderate Correlation (+ + or  -  - ) : Coefficient between 0.5 and 0.7
Weak Correlation (+ or  - ) : Coefficient between 0.3 and 0.5
Negligible Correlation (no symbol) : Coefficient < 0.3
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it is found that CP produces minimal correlation for most factors and hence can be
considered the most resilient to variation in individual characteristics of users.
Blacklisting
Having looked at the personal characteristics of the individual users and the effect
they had on the performance of the algorithms, it was important to examine whether
changing access control decisions with respect to an individual friend has any effect on
the usefulness of communities. Particularly, the focus was on the friends for each user for
whom the access control policy remained constant across the 10 photos. That is, they
were either selected in the audience for all 10 photos by the user or they were excluded
from the audience in all photos.
There were only 3 out of the 26 users who had any friends who were always selected
in the audience for all of the 10 photos. One user had 2 such friends while the other two
users had 1 friend each in this category. The other 23 users had no friends who were
constantly selected in every photo. This negligible proportion of permanently selected
friends rules out the possibility of creating a subset of friends who would always be
granted access. The results indicate that such a policy would not affect many friends and
hence would not enhance an access control mechanism based on communities sufficiently.
When looking for friends who were always excluded from the audience, a larger
variation was observed. All the 26 users had at least one friend who was always excluded
from the audience of each of the 10 photos. The average ratio of friends who were never
selected was found to be 55.4\% (s.d = 31.2\%). This means that the average user excluded
more than half of his friend list from each photo.
These always excluded friends could be removed from their respective communities
and put into a ``blacklist"". The effect of such blacklisting on the penalty of exclusion
was examined. Although there was no significant difference between the algorithms with
respect to this metric, as explained earlier, the algorithm with the best performance
for this metric, Infomap, was used for this evaluation. The Infomap communities were
reorganized after removing the blacklisted friends.
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The average reduction in penalty after removing the blacklisted friends, for the entire
set of 26 users, was found to be 44\% (s.d = 29.6\%). This can be regarded as a substantial
improvement on the penalty values calculated earlier. The high standard deviation in
the reduction suggests that the reduction varies for different users. A cluster analysis
was conducted to identify subsets of users based on different levels of penalty reduction
using ``Two Step Clustering"" [SJL10] which generated the following subsets:
1. High Reduction : This group of 15 users (5 males \& 6 females) had an average
penalty reduction of 66.2\%(s.d = 14.56\%). The average audience across 10 photos
for the average user in this subset was 26.98, the median was 12.3 and the standard
deviation was 31.34. Thus, these users can be classified as Consistently Low
Selectors.
2. Low Reduction - This group of 11 users (10 males \& 5 females) had an average
penalty reduction of 13.8\%(s.d = 11.99\%). The average audience across 10 photos
for the average user in this subset was 55.03, the median was 59.9 and the standard
deviation was 32.81. Thus, it can be seen that these users select a larger audience
on average.
The difference between the average audience of the users in the two clusters was found
to be statistically significant using the Mann-Whitney test (p < 0.05). The difference in
terms of size of friend network was not found to be statistically significant (p = 0.305).
Moreover, there was a significantly negative correlation (Pearson Coefficient =  - 0.411)
found between average audience per photo and average reduction in penalty. This means
that users who select smaller audiences are more likely to benefit from the blacklisting
process.
5.3.3 Effect of Photo
This section examines whether the photo being shared had any effect on the performance
of the algorithms. The two attributes to define the photos were the source (whether
they were brought by the user or downloaded randomly from the user's Facebook profile
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during the user study) and the categories (selected by the user during the study).
Source of Photo
Participants chose audiences for 10 photos, 5 randomly chosen from their Facebook
account and 5 brought on a USB drive. There was negligible correlation (all coefficients
< 0.1) between the source of the photo and the performance of the algorithms for all the
3 metrics.
Photo Categories
There were some cases where a clear difference was evident between the categories
users selected for the photos which had a very high audience as compared to the low
audience photos. For example, one user selected high audience for photos which they
categorized as ``Event"" and ``Animals"" but low audience for photos which were categorized
as ``People(friends or family)"". This observation prompted a more detailed analysis into
the effect of photo categories on the audience size of a photo.
As can be seen from Table 5.3, ``People(friend or family)"", ``Personal"" and ``Travel""
were the most commonly selected categories. On the other hand, ``Celebrity"", ``Fashion"",
``Technology"" and ``Advertising"" were the least selected ones. It can also be seen that
``Fashion"" has the highest average audience. ``Advertising"", ``Celebrity"" and ``Animals""
have high average audiences as well. It should be noted here that the total number of
photos in the table are more than 260 as the users were able to select multiple categories
for each photo.
To give an idea of the privacy implication of each photo category, as perceived by
the users, the last two columns of Table 5.3 shows the number of occasions a particular
category had the minimum and maximum number of audience members for a particular
user. It can be seen that ``Personal"" photos have the highest number of occurrences
when they have the minimum audience for a particular user. However, they also have a
substantial number of cases where they have the maximum audience. Similarly, ``People
(friends or family)"" has a high number of minimum as well as maximum audience
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of audiences of photos from each photo category
No. Categories Photos
Audience Size No. of times
Avg. S.D Med. Max Min
1 Landscape 21 53.83 42.05 51 2 1
2 People (Others) 14 54.72 70.81 29 2 3
3 People (friends) 69 52.37 42.73 58 9 5
4 Architecture 20 42.85 62.07 17 2 3
5 Animals 11 86.52 80.58 64 3 2
6 Travel 54 58.51 37.57 60 6 5
7 Fashion 6 143.44 93.85 191 1 1
8 Celebrity 3 84.33 105.10 42 1 0
9 Event 35 62.53 77.4 21 3 2
10 Humor 22 57 60.57 31 3 3
11 Food 13 44.52 47.82 32 2 3
12 Advertising 4 89.33 102.40 57 0 0
13 Entertainment 51 43.68 45.88 25 2 3
14 Personal 60 32.90 30.07 26 5 9
15 Technology 6 49.40 79.68 22 1 1
occurrences. Thus, it can be seen from these results that privacy preferences vary
between users and no definitive conclusions can be drawn about privacy implications of
categories on their own.
After inspecting this further, it was found that there was negligible correlation
between the photo categories and the performance of the algorithms according to the
evaluation criteria. It was also observed that photo categories had negligible correlation
with audience size of the photo. There was a possibility that the variability in audience
selection of the 11 users for whom the reduction in penalty was low was due to photo
categories. A linear regression analysis was performed in order to understand the effect
of photo category on audience size for these users but found no significant effect. The
correlation coefficients were also low with the highest being 0.243 for ``Advertising"".
Thus, there was negligible or very weak correlation between photo category and audience
size even for users selecting variable audiences.
Table 5.3 also shows that the audience size of most categories had a large standard
deviation. While this variation could be attributed to different types of users (high
selectors or low selectors) selecting the various categories, it was important to examine
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whether categories being paired with each other had any influence in the different average
audiences. There were some cases where combination of different categories influenced the
average audience. For example, average audience for ``Personal"" when taken alone is 32.90
whereas when it is paired with ``People(others)"", it goes up to 92.27. Similar variations
can be observed across all categories. Categories which have a high average audience,
such as ``Fashion"" or ``Advertising"" can inflate the average audiences for other categories
if selected together for a particular photo. However, even for pairs or combinations
of categories, no conclusions could be made about privacy implications. For example,
a particular user selected categories ``People (friends or family)"" and ``Travel"" for a
particular photo and selected 6 audience members while a different photo shared by a
different user with the same categories had 191 members. Such variations were commonly
observed across all combinations of categories.
It is safe to conclude from the above discussion that there were no noticeable effects
of the photo categories on the performance of the algorithms in our evaluations.
5.4 Discussion
This chapter presented a detailed empirical evaluation of 8 network based community
detection algorithm with the objective of identifying the most suitable algorithm to be
used to represent Relationship Type in REACT. The major findings of the evaluation are
as follows:
CP best in two out of the three metrics
CP produces the best results for number of communities required to complete a user's
desired audience as well as the ratio of audience in a single community. Its difference with
other algorithms in terms of these two metrics is also found to be statistically significant.
In terms of penalty for exclusion, the difference between all 8 algorithms is not found to
be statistically significant.
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Even best penalty not good enough for everyone
Infomap produces the lowest average penalty value of about 122. This means that even
leveraging communities created by the best algorithm for this metric, the user would
have to remove 122 friends on an average to create their desired access control policies.
This value can be considered prohibitively high and suggests that communities cannot
be readily leveraged for making access control decisions by all users.
Performance can be enhanced for users who consistently select low audience
We observed that penalty for exclusion could be reduced (avg reduction\sim 44\%) by
removing ``blacklisted"" friends from their respective Infomap communities. This suggests
that if access control mechanisms can identify frequently excluded friends over time and
rearrange communities to exclude these friends during audience selection, it can produce
much better results. These friends can be then put into a single community and a default
setting of denying access can be implemented for them. The results indicate that such a
scenario is most effective for users who select consistently low audiences and their penalty
for exclusion can be reduced substantially (\sim 66\%).
Size of network has an effect on penalty for exclusion
We observed that number of communities per audience and ratio of audience in largest
community have strong correlation with average audience of the individual. These corre-
lations were along expected lines as larger average audience required more communities
on average while a smaller average audience produced a higher likelihood that the ratio
of audience in a single community would be higher. The penalty for exclusion also had
a substantially positive correlation with size of a user's network. A noteworthy finding
emerging from this analysis is that CP had the lowest correlation coefficient for most of
these factors among all algorithms and can be considered comparatively resilient to these
variations in individuals' characteristics as a result.
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Nature of content has no significant effect on the performance of the algo-
rithms
Photo category played a negligible role in determining the size of audience. This suggests
that participants interpret categories differently and also that category of the photo alone
is not enough to determine audience. We also looked at the performance of algorithms
according to the photo categories based on the evaluation metrics but no significant
conclusions could be made from that analysis as well.
5.5 Conclusion
As a result of the analysis presented in this chapter, Clique Percolation Method (CP)
emerges as the most suitable network based community detection algorithm which
has the best fit with access control decisions made by users during the user study.
Therefore, Relationship Type would be represented using the CP membership of friends
in the implementation of REACT. The high penalty for exclusion values, for algorithms
including CP, indicate that using only community detection is not a sufficient solution on
its own for the access control problems faced by social media users. This further points
in the direction of combining Relationship Type, denoted by community membership,
with other aspects of the overall context of the disclosure such as Relationship Strength




The relationship strength component of REACT uses information stored in the social
media profiles of the users as was discussed in Chapter 3. The information contained in
social media profiles can often be vast and can depend on the particular social media
site. Social media sites such as Facebook, for example, have rich user profiles where
users are encouraged to provide a lot of personal details such as age, location, workplace,
family members, etc. On the other hand, other social media sites such as Twitter allow
users to have minimal profiles without even requiring real names. There are numerous
ways in which this information can be leveraged to enhance access control mechanisms.
One particular way is to use profile information to calculate relationship closeness or
``tie-strength"" to define relationships between individuals in a social network. Tie-strength
can be measured by looking at the amount of communication between individuals or
similarity between their profile information [GK09] and can then be used to assist users
while making access control decisions [TCS12]. In real life, individuals often share
different information with different people based on their perceived closeness with them.
For example, a user may choose to disclose something to only his ``close friends"" but
not to ``distant"" or ``weak"" relationships [Gra73]. This situation can be reproduced
while disclosing information on social media sites where tie-strength information may be
provided to the user while making access control decisions [TCS12]. Such interventions
may enable the user to share their content with a desired audience in terms of the strength
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of their relationship with them and preserve its contextual integrity [Nis04].
For relationship strength to be efficiently represented in REACT, it is imperative
to identify the most suitable set of profile attributes which are relevant in an access
control scenario. This chapter describes the results of an empirical evaluation of 30 profile
attributes, which were created from the Facebook profiles of the participants of the user
study described in Chapter 4 and their interpersonal communication with their friends,
and goes on to find the minimal subset which is deemed to be suitable to represent
relationship strength in REACT.
6.1 Challenges
There are several challenges while using social media profile data to enhance an access
control mechanism [AFW12]:
\bullet Fetching Time: The time taken to fetch the profile information from the social
network profiles of users and their friends required for the relevant attributes takes
time which slows down the process of access control recommendation. In social
media, users cannot be expected to wait for a long time before sharing information.
Therefore, the time taken to fetch the relevant information, to facilitate calculation
of similarity, should be minimal.
\bullet Computation: The profile information should be easily converted into profile vectors
which can be analyzed to calculate similarity between users. Attributes which
require extensive computation, such as examining the lists of events attended by
individual users to identify common attendances, for example, would put a burden
on the overall system which can lead to delays in providing the access control
recommendation to the user.
\bullet Availability : The calculation of profile similarity to represent relationship strength
depends on the information in the users' profiles. However, users have often been
found to leave profile fields blank (especially for information deemed to be sensitive
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such as age, religion, sexual orientation, political affiliation, etc.) and this missing
information will affect the performance of any resulting mechanism [AFW12].
\bullet Privacy : The profile attributes used should not require information which can
be considered sensitive or ``privacy intrusive"" as using such information would
defeat the purpose of creating a privacy enhancing mechanism. For example, if an
access control mechanism requires access to the content of the personal messages
exchanged between users, it can be considered to be privacy intrusive and cannot
be considered a suitable solution.
Looking at these challenges, it seems imperative to identify the minimal subset of
profile features which can be used to accurately predict access control decisions and make
appropriate suggestions to the user while overcoming these challenges. The endeavor is
to create an access control mechanism which provides accurate suggestions with minimal
profile information from the users or their friends.
6.2 Systematic Feature Engineering
In order to identify the most appropriate profile attributes to represent relationship
strength in REACT, a baseline of 30 profile attributes were considered. Table 6.1 shows
the full list of all profile attributes which were evaluated. These attributes were created
with the objective of including as much available information as possible from Facebook
profiles of the users. The table also shows that all attributes considered by previous
approaches were included in addition to some extra ones which are generally available in
social media infrastructure. We could not compare our list with works which did not
explicitly provide the list of profile attributes they used.
6.2.1 Sample
As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the entire sample size of the user study was 26 users and
the total number of access control decisions made by them was 68,840. However, in order
to evaluate similarity in profile attributes between users and their friends, access to their
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Table 6.1: Comparison of the subsets of profile attributes used to create profile vectors in the
different approaches
No. Profile Feature Type
This Social ReGroup BFF
Work Circles
[ML12] [AFW12] [FSEGF14]
1 Friendship Duration Derived \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52}
2 Recency of Comm. Derived \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52}
3 Amount seen together Derived \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52}
4 Wall Messages Derived \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52}
5 Inbox Messages Derived \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52}
6 Mutual Friends Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52}
7 Gender Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
8 Age Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
9 Family Membership Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
10 Home Town Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
11 Home State Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
12 Home Country Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
13 Current City Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
14 Current State Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
15 Current Country Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
16 Education Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52}
17 Work Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
18 Likes Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{52}
19 Events Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54}
20 Politics Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54}
21 Religion Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54}
22 Interests Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54}
23 Links Shared Derived \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{52}
24 Music Direct \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{54}
25 Movies Direct \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{54}
26 Languages Direct \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{54}
27 Sports Direct \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{54}
28 Total Friends Direct \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{52}
29 Friend Difference Direct \ding{52} \ding{54} \ding{54} \ding{54}
30 Age Difference Direct \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{52} \ding{54}
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profile information was required. Due to the Facebook API1, only the profile information
of users who use an application (and explicitly provide data access permissions) is available
for collection. This meant that profile information of only the friends of the participants
who were also participating themselves in the study was available. To mitigate this, we
particularly encouraged groups of people to participate in the study so that a particular
participant would have some Facebook friends also participating in the study which
would enable us to get their profile information. The users did not know the information
of which of their friends would be accessed and hence made access control decisions with
respect to each of their friends in order to avoid biasing their decisions. Nevertheless, this
resulted in a reduced sample size for this evaluation as compared to the other analyses
presented in this thesis. There were 23 participants who had at least two friends for
whom profile information was available. Out of these 23 participants, 14 (61\%) were
male. The average age of the participants was 32 years (s.d=10, max=61, min=23).
Considering each available friend profile of the 23 participants and all photos for which
they selected audiences, this dataset contained a total of 689 access control decisions
which was used to evaluate profile attributes to identify the most suitable subset.
6.2.2 Coding Profile Attributes
The profile information, which was collected during the user study, had to be converted
into profile vectors for each user and their friends to capture the similarity between them.
The aim was to create as many profile attributes as possible using the data that was
collected during the user study. Descriptive fields such as ``About Me"" and ``User Bio""
were ignored as it would be hard to find similarity between users for such fields. After
the study, it was found that none of the participants disclosed ``Relationship Status"" and
``Significant Other"" on their profiles so it was automatically discarded. The attributes
listed in Table 6.1 are categorized in the following two types:
\bullet Direct : These attributes can be directly fetched from the Facebook profile of the
user or their friend. No calculation or aggregation is required.
1https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apps/upgrading
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\bullet Derived : These attributes are created by aggregating different forms of communi-
cation (for eg: posts, messages or photos) between a user and a particular friend.
22 out of the 30 profile attributes shown in Table 6.1 are Direct attributes and were
fetched directly from the Facebook profiles. Intuitively, the computational cost of creating
profile vectors is minimized if a large number of attributes are Direct as opposed to
Derived. Thus, the method of obtaining the attribute is an important factor to consider
while evaluating the profile attributes.
The coding of profile attributes followed in this work and described here is most
similar to [ML12] as they also looked to create vectors based on similarity of profiles.
However, as Table 6.1 shows, this work considers some additional attributes which were
not included by them. The various attributes were coded in different ways depending on
the type of information they contain in order to capture the similarity between a user
and his friends.
\bullet Friendship Duration and Recency of Communication between a particular user and
a specific friend were calculated by counting the number of days since the first and
latest communication (such as wall post, message, like, etc.) respectively.
\bullet Amount seen together, Wall messages and Inbox messages were all coded by simply
counting the number of interactions shared by the user and a particular friend. A
zero value indicates that no interaction took place between them during the time
for which the data was collected.
\bullet Mutual friends, Links shared and Events denote the common friends, links and
events attended by a user and a particular friend.
\bullet Gender was coded as a binary variable to capture the similarity between the user
and each friend. Here, `1' indicates that the user and the friend had the same
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gender while a `0' indicates a dissimilarity.
\bullet Age and Total friends were taken directly from the users' profiles. In addition to
this, the difference (absolute value) between the user's age and a friend's age was
calculated as a new variable called Age Difference. This gives a measure of the gap
between the user and a potential audience member in terms of their age. A similar
calculation was done for Total Friends to create the variable Friend Difference.
\bullet Family membership was coded as a binary variable where a `1' indicates that the
particular friend was disclosed as a family member of the user while a `0' indi-
cates that no such family relationships was found between friend and the user.
This includes cases where the user did not disclose family relationships on Facebook.
\bullet The attributes numbered 10 to 27 in Table 6.1 were coded to represent the number
of common entries. For example, if a user and a friend had exactly one common
educational institution, a `1' value was put for that variable, if they had two
common educational institutions, a `2' was put and so on. A `0' value captures
both non-matches and missing entries. Missing entries were coded as 0 to ensure
that we maximize the effect of matches between the values while capturing the
similarity between profiles.
6.2.3 Metrics
In order to identify the most suitable subset of attributes, a classifier was created with
all 30 attributes as an initial configuration. The objective was to identify attributes
which enable accurate prediction of access control decisions. The accuracy was evaluated
using the dataset of 689 ground truth access control decisions. The performance of
the classifier was evaluated using several well-established metrics for machine learning
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Table 6.2: Confusion matrix for evaluating performance
Recommendation
Allow Deny
Access Control Allow TP FN
Decisions Deny FP TN
classifiers [CLB+16] to give a broad picture of the performance. The metrics used are as
follows:
\bullet Specificity : It is measured as a ``true-negative rate"" which is a proportion of ``deny""
instances (from ground truth) that are correctly predicted as such.
\bullet Sensitivity : This is the ``true-positive rate"" or ``recall"" which is the proportion of
``allow"" instances that are correctly predicted as ``allow"" by the classifier.
\bullet Precision: This is the proportion of ``allow"" predictions which were actually ``allow""
in the ground truth access control decisions.
\bullet F-measure: This is a harmonic mean of Precision and Sensitivity and gives a
measure of the overall performance of the classifier.
\bullet Accuracy : This measures the proportion of correct, both ``allow"" and ``deny"",
predictions made by the classifier.
Table 6.2 shows the confusion matrix for evaluating the performance of the classifier.
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Table 6.3: Classifier considering all 30 profile attributes shown for each algorithm
Algorithm Specificity Sensitivity Precision F-measure Accuracy
Naive-Bayes 93.4\% 45.3\% 67.3\% 0.541 82.3\%
SVM 98.5\% 37.1\% 88.1\% 0.522 84.3\%
Random Forest 93.8\% 64.2\% 75.6\% 0.694 86.9\%





TP + TN + FP + FN
(6.5)
where, TP = True Positives, FP = False Positives, TN = True Negatives, FN =
False Negatives
6.3 Results
The profile information was coded, as has been described, to create profile attributes
to be used to ascertain similarity between profiles. The access control decisions made
by the participants were coded as `1' (for ``allow"") and `0' (for ``deny""). The classifier
was created using three different classification algorithms: Naive-Bayes [Mur06], Support
Vector Machines [HDO+98] and Random Forest [LW02]. All algorithms were implemented
using Weka [HFH+09] with 10 fold cross validation using the entire dataset of 689 access
control decisions. The results for the classifier created with all 30 profile attributes is
shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 shows that while SVM produces the best specificity and precision for the
classifier, using Random Forest clearly produces the best overall performance, especially
in terms of Sensitivity. Therefore, it can be concluded that Random Forest is the most
suitable classification algorithm for this dataset.
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6.3.1 Class Balancing
The dataset obtained from the user study, which was considered for the analysis of profile
attributes, consisted of 689 access control decisions from 23 users as explained earlier.
Out of them, 159 were ``allow"" while 530 were ``deny"". Thus, there is an imbalance
observed as the ratio of ``deny"" decisions is higher than ``allow"" decisions. Such a ``class
imbalance"" is known to adversely affect classification and can be mitigated by employing
class balancing techniques [JS02]. The class balancing techniques used in this evaluation
are:
\bullet Class Balancer : In this technique, synthetic instances of the rarer class (``allow"" in
our case) are added in a way such that ground truth of both classes is equal. This
leads to a fractional number of instances for the classifier results (shown in results).
\bullet Spread Subsampling : This technique does not introduce any synthetic instances
but rather redistributes the frequency of both classes in an attempt to balance the
dataset.
\bullet Cost Sensitive Learning : ``Cost sensitive learning"" [LS11, Elk01] penalizes any
instance of the rarer class (``allow"" in our case) classified as ``deny"". The penalty or
cost can be varied to produce desirable results. For these evaluations, the cost was
increased starting from 1 (default) systematically to a point where the F-measure
and accuracy of the classifier started decreasing when compared to the original,
unbalanced, classifier.
It should be noted that for Random Forest and Naive-Bayes classification algorithms,
using the default cost of 1 (not penalizing misclassifications of ``allow"" class) produced
better results than increasing the cost. Overall, it can be seen that Random Forest
produces the best results for all balancing modes in terms of F-measure and Accuracy.
While Class Balancer improves F-measure when compared to the unfiltered mode (Table
6.3), due to the improvement in Precision and Sensitivity, it comes at the expense of losing
accuracy of classification. This is due to the possibility that the Class Balancer filter
overbalances the dataset which in turn ha an adverse effect on accuracy of classification.
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Table 6.4: Results of classifier created with all 30 attributes when using the class balancing techniques
Technique Algorithm Specificity Sensitivity Precision F-measure Accuracy
Class Naive-Bayes 81.5\% 57.9\% 75.8\% 0.656 69.7\%
Balancer SVM 78.8\% 67.2\% 76.1\% 0.714 73\%
Random Forest 77.2\% 73\% 76.2\% 0.745 75.1\%
Spread Naive-Bayes 93.2\% 45.9\% 67\% 0.545 82.3\%
Subsample SVM 97.4\% 37.1\% 80.8\% 0.509 83.5\%
Random Forest 93.2\% 60.4\% 72.7\% 0.660 85.6\%
Cost Naive-Bayes 93.4\% 45.3\% 67.3\% 0.541 82.3\%
Sensitive SVM 95.3\% 49.1\% 75.7\% 0.595 84.6\%
Random Forest 93.8\% 64.2\% 75.6\% 0.694 86.9\%
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6.4 Identification of Minimal Subset of Attributes
The objective of evaluating all these 30 profile attributes was to identify the minimal
profile vector to be used for similarity based access control. This minimal profile vector
would be used to represent relationship strength in the implementation of REACT. To
achieve this objective, a systematic evaluation of each individual profile attribute was
required to understand their contribution to the prediction of access control decisions.
Two established techniques of evaluating attributes were used to achieve this objective:
Correlation and Information Gain.
6.4.1 Correlation Order
The 30 profile attributes are ordered according to their correlation coefficient in Table
6.5. It can be seen that the absolute value of the correlation coefficient is used to order
attributes as even a negative correlation coefficient means that the attribute contributes
to the prediction.
It can be seen in the table that Wall Messages have the highest correlation coefficient
(0.304). It is also evident that attributes such as Music, Religion, Sports, Politics,
Education, etc., have very low correlation possibly because many users often leave them
blank in their profiles [AFW12].
6.4.2 Information Gain Order
Weka [HFH+09] was used to calculate the ``information gain"" for each profile attribute
to understand how they contribute to the classifier. The 30 profile attributes are ranked
according to the information gain value in Table 6.6. It can be seen from the table that
Amount Seen Together has the highest information gain (0.213). It is also interesting
to note that there are 10 profile attributes which do not provide any information gain
(attributes 21-30 in Table 6.6)
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Table 6.5: Profile Attributes ranked according to Correlation with Access Control Prediction
No. Profile Attribute Correlation Coefficient
1 Wall Messages 0.304
2 Photos Together 0.272
3 Interests 0.253
4 Home Town 0.232
5 Friend Difference -0.214
6 Current State 0.212
7 Mutual Friends 0.211
8 Current City 0.207
9 Events -0.195
10 Friendship Duration 0.194
11 Home State 0.194
12 Gender -0.193
13 Recency of Communication 0.186
14 Total Likes -0.175
15 Total Friends -0.167
16 Movies 0.143
17 Links Shared -0.141
18 Age Difference -0.133
19 Work -0.115
20 Family 0.106
21 Home Country 0.086
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Table 6.6: Profile Attributes ranked according to Information Gain
No. Profile Attribute Information Gain
1 Amount seen together 0.213
2 Total Friends 0.190
3 Mutual Friends 0.182
4 Friendship Duration 0.175
5 Likes 0.174
6 Friend Difference 0.154
7 Age Difference 0.107
8 Movies 0.102
9 Links Shared 0.096
10 Wall Messages 0.071
11 Events 0.067
12 Interests 0.050
13 Recency of Communication 0.045
14 Home Town 0.037
15 Age 0.036
16 Current State 0.034
17 Current City 0.032




22 Home Country -






29 Inbox Messages -
30 Education -
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Figure 6.1: Number of attributes required for correlation and information gain ordering to
achieve target accuracy of 86.9\%
6.4.3 Systematic Identification of Minimal Subset
In order to identify the minimal subset of attributes which are most suited to predicting
access control decisions made by users, both correlation and information gain order of
profile attributes was used as separate starting points. The objective was to create a
classifier using a minimum number of attributes to achieve a target accuracy of 86.9\%
using Random Forest classification algorithm, which was the highest accuracy of prediction
found in Table 6.3. No class balancing technique was used for these evaluations.
Figure 6.1 clearly shows that it requires the first 10 attributes of the correlation order
to produce an accuracy of 86.9\% whereas only the first three attributes in the information
gain order produce the same accuracy. Therefore, it is clear that the top three attributes
with highest information gain, namely, Amount Seen Together (0.213), Total Friends
(0.190) and Mutual Friends (0.182) (see Table 6.6), are sufficient in producing the target
accuracy of prediction.
As the objective was to find a minimal subset of attributes, it was important to explore
all possibilities of further reducing the subset of these three attributes while keeping the
accuracy of prediction intact. Classifiers were created systematically with all possible
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combinations of these 3 profile attributes to see if any combination, of less than three
profile attributes, would be sufficient to produce the required accuracy of prediction. It
was found that the only combination of less than three profile attributes which produced
the required accuracy of 86.9\% was the pair (Total Friends,Mutual Friends). All other
combinations of less than three attributes, including using each of the three attributes
individually, would reduce the accuracy below this level. Thus, the outcome of the
systematic evaluation of 30 profile attributes is the pair (Total Friends,Mutual Friends)
which is seen to be sufficient in accurately predicting access control decisions.
6.5 Comparison with Previous Approaches
Table 6.1 had shown the sets of profile attributes considered by previous approaches
which use profile information to enhance access control mechanisms. After identifying
the minimal subset of attributes in the previous section, it is important to compare the
results produced by classifiers created by using these two attributes, Total Friends \&
Mutual Friends, with those produced by classifiers created by using subsets of attributes
used by previous approaches. This comparison was done on the available dataset of 689
access control decisions described earlier in this chapter.
6.5.1 Performance of Classifier
Figure 6.2 shows the comparison of F-measure and Accuracy produced by classifiers
using different subsets of profile attributes used by earlier approaches. The classifier was
implemented using Random Forest classification algorithm without any class balancing.
It can be seen that BFF [FSEGF14] produces the same F-measure and Accuracy as
the best subset (Total Friends and Mutual Friends) as it included both these attributes
(see Table 6.1). While Social Circles [ML12] and ReGroup [AFW12] both considered
Mutual Friends, they failed to include Total Friends (or size of network) which results in
a slightly lower performance as compared to the best values. Thus, it can be concluded
that using these two attributes is sufficient to predict access control decisions with the
same accuracy as with using all 30 attributes as well as any attribute subset that has
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(a) F-measure Comparison
(b) Accuracy Comparison
Figure 6.2: Comparison of F-measure and Accuracy produced by classifiers created from different
subsets of profile attributes
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Figure 6.3: Time (in seconds) required to fetch profile information using Facebook API corre-
sponding to each subset of profile attributes
been used in previous approaches.
6.5.2 Temporal Cost
Another important factor to consider when determining the usability of these two identified
profile attributes is the time it would take to fetch the necessary profile information
to create these attributes. Both Total Friends as well as Mutual Friends are Direct
attributes (see Table 6.1) which means that they can be directly fetched from a user's
social media profile.
A comparison of the estimated time taken to fetch the profile information necessary
to create the profile vectors containing (Mutual Friends,Total Friends) and the subset of
profile attributes used by Social Circles [ML12], ReGroup [AFW12] \& BFF [FSEGF14]
is shown in Figure 6.3. This time was calculated by running API calls for a Facebook
profile with 320 friends with default settings. The time was calculated by creating 50
API calls to fetch the corresponding subset of profile attributes and taking the average
for each proposed mechanism. It can be clearly seen in the figure that using (Mutual
Friends,Total Friends) takes far less time (about one-sixth of the next best) than it would
take to fetch attributes corresponding to the other approaches. This is primarily due to
the fact that the other approaches required communication information (such as wall
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messages, inbox messages, etc.) which require more time when compared to ``direct""
profile attributes such as mutual friends and total friends.
6.6 Discussion
Using profile attributes is often suggested to be an effective method of enhancing access
control prediction in existing literature. The evaluation presented in this chapter was
dedicated to identify the minimal subset of profile attributes which could be used to
represent Relationship Strength in REACT. The results of the evaluation enable the
identification of Mutual Friends and Total Friends as the two profile attributes which
can be used. The results show that using these two attributes is sufficient to match the
accuracy of prediction (86.9\%) produced by using all 30 profile attributes which were
considered. In addition to providing the required accuracy of prediction, the identification
of this minimal subset enhances previous profile similarity based access control models in
the following ways:
Less time to fetch required information
It has been shown that the time required to fetch all relevant information from Facebook
profiles for the 2 attributes identified in this chapter is about one-sixth of the time required
for fetching information required for the subset of profile attributes corresponding to the
quickest among previous works.
Easy creation of profile vectors
The ``direct"" attributes Total Friends and Mutual Friends are both simply numeric values
which can be directly fetched from the users' profiles and incorporated in the profile
vector without the need of processing a lot of information. There are certain attributes
like Education, Workplace, etc. that can have different names for the same entity (for e.g.
the same organization may have multiple pages which different users may affiliate with
while belonging to the same organization) which makes coding more difficult. For both
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Total Friends and Mutual Friends, coding is unambiguous as these are simply numeric
values.
Less intrusive information gathering
The two identified attributes do not rely on communication (messages, wall posts, etc.)
between individuals and hence can be considered less intrusive than other models which
use such information. The other approaches which are discussed in this chapter all rely
on such potentially intrusive information to create the profile vectors.
Cannot be left blank or faked
Both Total Friends and Mutual Friends are attributes that are automatically calculated
and updated by the social media site itself. The users cannot manipulate this data in
any way. These attributes do not require access to any identifying information such
as Gender, Address, Age, Workplace, etc., which are often left blank by users on their
profiles.
Found in most social media infrastructures
The size of the users' network (Total Friends) and the number of shared connections
(Mutual Friends) are attributes which can be found on most social media sites. While the
analysis was conducted using information from Facebook profiles as mentioned earlier, the
identification of these particular attributes ensures that the resulting mechanism, REACT,
can be extended to other social media infrastructures as these particular attributes (or
equivalent attributes) can be found in most other social media sites.
6.7 Conclusion
The systematic feature engineering presented in this chapter led to the identification of
Total Friends and Mutual Friends as the two most suitable profile attributes to predict
access control decisions. In addition to them being sufficient in matching prediction
accuracy of previously proposed approaches, these attributes are also always available
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in social network infrastructure, are easy to process and require less time to be fetched.
These advantages assume a lesser burden on REACT while using these attributes to
represent relationship strength as discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 where the
implementation of REACT is described.
A limitation of the analysis presented in this chapter is the comparatively reduced
size of the dataset of access control decisions which could be considered. This was due
to the API restrictions by Facebook2 (as discussed in Section 6.2.1) which meant that
profile information of only the users who participated was available for collection and
analyses. We mitigated this by encouraging groups of people to participate in the study
so that a particular participant would have some Facebook friends also participating in
the study which would enable us to get their profile information. These API restrictions
make sense from a privacy perspective as malicious third party applications are not able
to access personal information of users who do not use their application and hence do
not provide explicit consent to their information being used. However, this makes it
challenging for any mechanisms which rely on profile information of friends and evaluation
of such mechanisms becomes an extremely challenging task. There is no way, for instance,
that profile vectors representing a user's friends can be created if those friends are not
using the particular application. In light of this, the profile attributes Total Friends and
Mutual Friends are even more useful as they are mostly publicly disclosed by most users
and are hence easily accessible. Therefore, these API restrictions did not impact the
implementation and evaluation of REACT shown in Chapter 7 as these profile attributes
were available for the entire dataset of users and will also have negligible impact on future






Recommendation of access control decisions has been seen as a solution to ease the burden
on social media users and address some of the social privacy problems they face. The
primary contribution of this thesis has been an access control recommendation mechanism,
REACT, which considers the overall context of the information disclosure by including
attributes representing Relationship Type, Relationship Strength in conjunction with the
information about the Content. The detailed design of REACT was presented in Chapter
3. The empirical evaluation of 8 community detection algorithms presented in Chapter 5
aimed to identify the most suitable network best community detection algorithm to be
used to represent relationship type in REACT while the evaluation of 30 profile attributes
created from Facebook profiles of users presented in Chapter 6 was aimed to identify the
most suitable set of attributes to represent relationship strength. Having identified these
components of REACT, this chapter presents the detailed evaluation of the performance
of REACT implemented using the identified components. The chapter describes how
each component of REACT was implemented and then goes on to discuss the results of
evaluating the access control recommendations made by REACT using the access control
decisions made by the users during the user study described in Chapter 4.
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7.1 Instantiating and Implementing REACT
At the heart of REACT is a machine learning algorithm which considers the attributes that
constitute the three components, namely, relationship type and strength and information
about the content, to provide ``allow""/``deny"" type access control recommendations to the
user. REACT is agnostic to the machine learning algorithm. For the evaluation presented
in this chapter, three different classification algorithms, namely, Naive-Bayes [Mur06],
Support Vector Machines [HDO+98] and Random Forest [LW02] were implemented using
Weka [HFH+09] with 10 fold cross validation with instances generated in the user
study made by each user separately. The use of cross-validation is known to minimize
over-fitting to the data and it rules out the possible bias associated with division of a
dataset into training and test sets.
REACT also relies on blacklisting friends in order to assign a default ``deny"" rec-
ommendation to these friends and hence reduce the number of friends for whom access
control recommendations need to be computed for each user. The rest of this section
describes how each component of REACT was implemented for the evaluation shown in
this chapter. The results of the evaluation are shown later in Section 7.2.
7.1.1 Relationship Type
Relationship type is represented by community membership in REACT and Chapter 5
presented the findings of the detailed empirical evaluation of 8 well-known network based
community detection algorithms. The results of the evaluation helped identify Clique
Percolation Method (CP) [DPV05] as the most suitable community detection algorithm
to be used in REACT as it produced the best fit with access control decisions made
by users during the user study. CP, like any other network based community detection
algorithm in this context, only needs to be executed to update communities when a
new friend is added or removed from a user's network, but not every time a user would
make an access control decision which happens much more often. Therefore, even though
CP has a comparatively higher computational complexity as compared to other similar
community detection algorithms (refer to Chapter 5), its impact on the timeliness of
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access control decisions would be minimal.
The communities were created for each user from their social network (which was
downloaded during the user study as an ``edgelist"" where each ``node"" represented each
friend and an ``edge"" represents links between them). The edgelist of each user was
used as input to the CP algorithm, implemented using the SNAP library [LS14] for this
evaluation, to create communities based on identifying ``cliques"" or connected sub-graphs
of the social network [DPV05].
The CP algorithm is based on identifying ``k-cliques"" depending on a predefined
value of the parameter ``k"". It can produce overlapping communities depending on the
value of ``k"" in the implementation [DPV05], i.e., if the value of ``k"" is kept at 2, it
produces non-overlapping communities, but a value greater than 2 produces increasing
number of potential overlapping communities. Given that community detection was used
to represent relationship type, it was essential to consider overlapping communities as
individuals on social media may share more than one relationship type (for e.g: a user's
``co-worker"" may also be a ``family member""), so the value of ``k"" was varied systematically,
keeping the other components static, to check whether creating overlapping communities
had any effect on the overall performance of REACT. The CP membership for each
friend of a user, and therefore the Relationship Type between the user and that friend, is
represented as a binary vector of dimension `n' (where `n' is the number of communities
CP creates for a user given her social network), in which each element in the vector
denotes whether a particular friend belongs to a particular community (denoted by ``1"")or
not (denoted by ``0"").
7.1.2 Relationship Strength
Strength of relationship or ``closeness"" between individuals on the social network can be
calculated by fetching and analyzing the similarity of profile attributes and information in
social networks [GK09, FSEGF14]. Chapter 6 presented a detailed empirical evaluation
of 30 profile attributes which could possibly be used to represent relationship type in
REACT. The results of the evaluation found a subset of two profile attributes, namely,
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the size of network (Total Friends) and shared contacts (Mutual Friends), to be the most
suitable to be used in an access control scenario. REACT also uses a third attribute which
calculates the difference in network sizes of the user and each of their friends (Friend
Difference), in addition to Total Friends and Mutual Friends to represent relationship
strength between a user and each member of their friend network.
Total Friends and Mutual Friends are both ``direct"" attributes and can be directly
fetched from the Facebook profiles of the users. Friend Difference can be simply calculated
as the absolute difference between the Total Friends of the user and each of their friends.
Thus, none of the attributes required to represent relationship strength in REACT were
``derived"" and hence no complex computation is necessary. An additional advantage of
using these attributes was that the API restrictions introduced in 20151, which resulted
in a reduced dataset for the evaluation of profile attributes presented in Chapter 6, do
not apply to these attributes. Therefore, Total Friends (and therefore Friend Difference)
as well as Mutual Friends was available for the entire dataset of 68,840 access control
decisions collected during the user study and could be used for evaluating REACT. The
values of Total Friends, Mutual Friends and Friend Difference were used as 3-dimension
vector to represent Relationship Strength between a user and a particular friend.
7.1.3 Content
In addition to considering attributes defining the type and strength of interpersonal
relationships, REACT also considers information about the content being shared in
order to completely represent the overall context of the information disclosure. Previous
research has shown that annotations of content by users employing ``tags"" can be used to
create access control policies and that they are minimally disruptive for the user [YKGS09].
These tags can be about the topic of the content (e.g., Flickr has a list of potential topic
categories for the photos users upload) or further information about the social context
(e.g., friends being tagged in photos or mentions being made to them in text posts).
In the current implementation of REACT, the tags, provided by the users during the
1https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apps/upgrading
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study, about photo categories and friends appearing in the photos were used. The photo
categories selected by the users were coded as a binary vector of dimension 15 (which
was the total number of photo categories that could be selected by the user for each
photo during the user study) which denotes whether the particular category was selected
(``1"") or not (``0"") by the user. Similarly, the tag with respect to friends was also coded
as a binary variable for each of the user's friends where ``1"" represents the case where a
particular friend was tagged in a particular photo and a ``0"" represented case where the
particular friend was not tagged by the user.
It is important to note here that the design of REACT is agnostic to the type of
content being shared and can be easily extended to other types of data such as text.
The design is also agnostic to the method in which the information about the content is
supplied and REACT can use any available tags, whether manually provided or generated
by automatic analysis of the content. In this implementation, the information about the
content was provided by the users in the form of annotations. This was done as users
are often found to interpret categories differently [MS16]. Moreover, this can also be
considered as a less intrusive method as access to the content itself is not required but only
the user's interpretation of the content is necessary. It is also easier to extend REACT
for other types of content without too much effort when relying on manual annotation as
specialized tools may not be required to be implemented to analyze the content which is
an alternative method of categorizing the content and use these classifications to inform
REACT about the content [SLSW15]. This method removes the responsibility of having
to annotate the content from the user as relying on manual annotation can suffer if users
simply avoid annotating the content. It is shown later in this chapter as to how REACT
can be personalized and tune itself to the availability and utility of various attributes
and still produce accurate recommendations as a possible mitigation to this problem.
7.1.4 Blacklisting
Social media users often have vast social networks consisting of many friends -- the users
in the sample used for this evaluation had an average of 265 friends (s.d = 121). However,
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Figure 7.1: Median percentage (across 26 users) of the ratio of blacklist identified after each
photo
it has been empirically found that social media users often intend to share their content
with a limited subset of their entire friend network [KBHC12, MO11]. REACT leverages
this intuition by maintaining a ``blacklist"" of friends for each user. It does not analyze
the relevant relationship information for these blacklisted friends and assigns a default
``deny"" access control recommendation for them. It is important to note that the specific
number of blacklisted friends depends on various factors for individual users such as
their access control behavior and their network size. Different social media users use
the medium differently and their access control behavior and patterns are different and
driven by their privacy preferences and their intentions [MO11]. For example, some users
may want to connect to and share with as many people as possible. For these users,
the number of blacklisted friends would be minimal. Alternatively, users may choose
to interact with only a small subset of their friends and the blacklist for these users
may contain a majority of their friends. Thus, the blacklist construction in REACT is
a personalized process in which a blacklist is learned based on previous access controls
decisions and, hence, it entirely depends on the preferences and access control behavior
of individual users.
In the implementation of REACT which is evaluated in this chapter, blacklisted
friends were identified by looking at the access control decisions made by users during the
user study and all friends who were never granted access by the user (``always excluded"")
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in any of the 10 photos were added to the blacklist. In reality, it may require even
less disclosure decisions to identify blacklisted friends for each user. To get a better
understanding of how many photos it would require to identify the blacklisted friends
for each user, it was necessary to identify the changes in access control decision made
by the users with respect to each of their friends. Particularly, it was required to find
which was the photo (photo 1 to photo 10) where each friend was granted access for the
first time. All friends who were denied access to the first photo are potentially in the
blacklist before the access control decisions for the second photo are checked, and so on.
The blacklisted friends are the only ones who were never granted access in any of the 10
photos. Thus, if only the blacklisted friends were denied access to all of the photos by the
user, which is an extremely static access control policy as the user would be selecting the
same audience for each of the 10 photos, then 100\% of the blacklist could be identified in
the first photo itself. In other words, all friends who were denied access in the first photo
would be automatically blacklisted in such a scenario. However, as we find in Figure 7.1,
this is not normally the case. The figure shows that the median percentage of blacklisted
friends for a user identified after the first photo is 76.8\% and reaches 93.1\% after only the
fourth photo. This essentially means that for most of the users, the entire blacklist can
be learned after 4 or 5 photos and anyone not granted access till this time would most
likely end up in the blacklist as they would not be granted access in any of the following
photos. This finding suggests that the blacklist can be learned by REACT fairly quickly
for all users with very few previous access control decisions made by the user.
7.2 Results
The performance of REACT was evaluated using the ground truth access control decisions
made by users during the user study described in Chapter 4. The friend networks of
all the users was collected during the study in order to create the communities using
the CP algorithm. As REACT only requires Total Friends and Mutual Friends from
the Facebook profiles, the evaluation could include all 68,840 access control decisions as
this information was present for all friends as it was not restricted by the API changes
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discussed earlier.
The results shown in this section correspond to the evaluation metrics described
earlier in Section 6.2.3 of Chapter 6 which are: Specificity (i.e., true negative rate) which
is a proportion of ``deny"" instances (from ground truth) that are correctly recommended
as such, Sensitivity (i.e., true positive rate or recall) is the proportion of ``allow"" instances
that are correctly recommended as ``allow"", Precision is the proportion of ``allow"" rec-
ommendations which were actually ``allow"" in the ground truth access control decisions,
F-measure is the harmonic mean of precision and sensitivity and finally, Accuracy which
is the proportion of correct, both ``allow"" and ``deny"", recommendations [CLB+16]. The
results were calculated using the confusion matrix shown in Table 6.2 in Chapter 6. The
instances for all the users were added up and the metrics were calculated for the entire
68,840 access control decisions for each of the results shown in this section.
7.2.1 Overlapping Communities
It has been discussed earlier in Section 7.1.1 that CP is able to produce overlapping
communities. To ensure that REACT was being implemented at its optimum capacity, it
was important to identify whether using overlapping communities is better or worse than
using non-overlapping communities in terms of overall performance of REACT. While
the evaluation of algorithms in Chapter 5 only features CP to produce non-overlapping
communities (k = 2) in order to facilitate comparison with the other seven algorithms, in
this evaluation REACT was implemented using CP of values ranging from k = 2 to k = 5
to account for overlapping communities while keeping the attributes corresponding to
relationship strength and information about the content constant. This could be done as
CP is the only algorithm being used and need not be compared to other algorithms here.
Table 7.1 clearly shows that Random Forest produces better results than the other two
classification algorithms. Looking at the k-values of the CP implementation, it is evident
that using k = 3 produces slightly better results than the other values. Using any value
greater than 2 produces overlapping communities and as 3 is found to be most suitable,
it can be said that considering overlapping CP communities benefits REACT. This also
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Table 7.1: Performance of REACT for different k values for CP while keeping the attributes corresponding to relationship strength and content
constant
K Algorithm Specificity Sensitivity Precision F-measure Accuracy
k = 2
Naive-Bayes 94.9\% 60.7\% 58.1\% 0.594 91.4\%
SVM 97.2\% 55.5\% 69.7\% 0.618 92.8\%
Random Forest 97.8\% 64.4\% 74.5\% 0.691 94.7\%
k = 3
Naive-Bayes 94.3\% 60.3\% 59.1\% 0.597 90.2\%
SVM 96.7\% 55.5\% 70.1\% 0.619 91.6\%
Random Forest 97.8\% 65.6\% 75.3\% 0.701 94.9\%
k = 4
Naive-Bayes 94.2\% 60.3\% 58.8\% 0.595 90.1\%
SVM 96.7\% 54.9\% 69.8\% 0.615 91.5\%
Random Forest 97.8\% 64.6\% 74.6\% 0.692 94.8\%
k = 5
Naive-Bayes 94.1\% 60.8\% 58.3\% 0.596 90.1\%
SVM 96.6\% 56.1\% 69.9\% 0.623 91.6\%
Random Forest 97.8\% 64.7\% 74.4\% 0.692 94.7\%
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seems to match a more accurate representation of a real life scenario as individuals on
social media often share more than one community/relationship type (an example is
when a user's ``family member"" is also a ``co-worker"" or ``classmate""). Increasing the
value to 4 and 5 however, did not improve the results further. Therefore, the most
suitable k-value for the CP implementation is 3. The results produced by REACT, with
Random Forest algorithm, for k = 3 for CP, calculated over the entire dataset of 68,840
access control decisions are: Specificity = 97.8\%, Sensitivity = 65.6\%, Precision
= 75.3\%, F-measure = 0.701 and Accuracy = 94.9\%.
7.2.2 Class Balancing
It can be seen in Table 7.1 that there is a rather important difference between specificity,
sensitivity, and precision; with specificity being much higher than the other two. While
specificity is very important in an access control scenario, as the ``true negative rate""
translates to the accuracy of ``deny"" classifications and a high specificity would ensure
that unintended disclosure is prevented, other metrics are also important as low values
for precision, for example, would mean that the user has to spend effort in changing
many ``deny"" recommendations to ``allow"" to obtain their desired access control policy.
Thus, while acknowledging the importance of high specificity and accuracy in an access
control scenario, it is important to explore further avenues of achieving high values for all
metrics in order to provide a mechanism which minimizes user effort as much as possible.
One of the reasons for specificity being substantially higher than precision and
sensitivity may be that, despite the use of a blacklisting approach by REACT, there
is still a difference between the number of friends being recommended allow and deny,
which is perfectly consistent with the expected access behavior exhibited by users when
confronted with individual access control decisions [KBHC12, SGA13]. In cases like this,
the machine learning literature recommends the use of class balancing techniques [JS02]
to produce more balanced results across all metrics. The class balancing techniques
employed are the same as those used in Chapter 6:
\bullet Class Balancer : In this technique, synthetic instances of the rarer class (``allow"" in
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Table 7.2: Overall results produced by REACT for all metrics, for all k-values of CP, and for all learning methods
Mode K-value Specificity Sensitivity Precision F-measure Accuracy
k=2 97.8\% 64.4\% 74.5\% 0.691 94.7\%
No k=3 97.8\% 65.6\% 75.3\% 0.701 94.9\%
Balancing k=4 97.8\% 64.6\% 74.6\% 0.692 94.8\%
k=5 97.8\% 64.7\% 74.4\% 0.692 94.7\%
k=2 97.1\% 70.1\% 84.8\% 0.768 92.1\%
Class k=3 97.2\% 72.7\% 85.7\% 0.787 92.6\%
Balancer k=4 97.2\% 70.7\% 85.2\% 0.773 92.3\%
k=5 97.2\% 70.9\% 85.2\% 0.774 92.3\%
k=2 97.8\% 64.5\% 74.7\% 0.692 94.8\%
Spread k=3 97.8\% 64.8\% 74.3\% 0.692 94.8\%
Subsample k=4 97.7\% 65.2\% 74.2\% 0.694 94.8\%
k=5 97.8\% 64.5\% 74.4\% 0.691 94.7\%
k=2 95.0\% 75.9\% 60.2\% 0.671 93.2\%
Cost k=3 95.1\% 76.6\% 61.0\% 0.679 93.4\%
Sensitive k=4 95.0\% 76.6\% 60.6\% 0.677 93.3\%
k=5 94.7\% 77.5\% 59.7\% 0.674 93.2\%
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our case) in a way such that ground truth of both classes is equal. This leads to
fractional number of instances for the classifier results (shown in results).
\bullet Spread Subsampling : This technique does not introduce any synthetic instances
but rather redistributes the frequency of both classes in an attempt to balance the
dataset.
\bullet Cost Sensitive Learning : ``Cost sensitive learning"" [LS11, Elk01] penalizes any
instance of the rarer class (``allow"" in our case) classified as ``deny"". The penalty or
cost can be varied to produce desirable results. For these evaluations, the cost was
increased starting from 1 (default) systematically to a point where the F-measure
and accuracy of the classifier started decreasing when compared to the original,
unbalanced, classifier. The cost was calculated separately for each user in the
sample.
Table 7.2 shows the results produced by REACT when using the three class balancing
techniques compared with those when no balancing is used. It can be seen from the table
that Cost Sensitive classification provides highest best sensitivity while no balancing
and Spread Subsample produce highest accuracy. However, looking at all the metrics,
and F-measure in particular, it is clear that Class Balancer provides the best overall
trade-off. It substantially improves precision of REACT when compared to no balancing.
Moreover, an improvement can also been in the values for sensitivity and it is noteworthy
that the improvement in both precision and sensitivity do not result in any decrease in
the value of specificity. Therefore, for the best configuration of REACT, i.e, using k = 3
for CP and class balancer filter, the metrics calculated using the entire dataset of 68,840
access control decision are: Specificity = 97.2\%, Sensitivity = 72.7\%, Precision
= 85.7\%, F-measure = 0.787 and Accuracy = 92.6\%. Thus, the further results
presented in this chapter consider CP implemented with k = 3 as well as using the Class
Balancer filter in the implementation of REACT.
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7.2.3 Personalizing REACT
The results presented so far in this chapter show that REACT produces highly accurate
access control recommendations according to the various evaluation metrics. It uses
the attributes, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, to represent Relationship Type and
Strength as well as the information about the Content itself. However, it is essential
to acknowledge that privacy and access control behavior is very personal to individual
users [ABL15], so there is the potential that a personalized approach would render even
better performance than a``one-size-fits-all"" solution. This led to further exploration of
possible methods to try and personalize the configuration of REACT such that it uses
the most appropriate set of attributes for each individual user.
With these objectives in mind, two established attribute selection techniques were tried
to identify subsets of attributes that could be used to configure REACT for individual
users:
\bullet Principal Components: Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is an established
method of attribute selection [LCZT07]. It produces principal components created
from an attribute list and the number of these principal components are less than or
equal to the number of original attributes. PCA was used to identify the appropriate
attributes for each individual user.
\bullet Information Gain: Information gain is a good indicator of the contribution of each
attribute towards the classifier performance. It was used in Chapter 6 to order the
attributes of the classifier. Here, information gain is used to check which of the
used attributes actually contribute to the performance of REACT. For each user,
the attributes with zero information gain were removed from the configuration.
These attribute selection techniques were tried for each individual user and the results
were compared, for each user, with those produced by including all available attributes.
The focus was on F-measure as well as accuracy to signify a better trade-off in terms of
all metrics for each individual user when selecting the best mechanism. In addition to
information gain and PCA, a correlation based approach [Hal99] was also tried. However,
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Table 7.3: Number of users for whom each attribute subset provided best results




Table 7.4: Values for all metrics, calculated over entire dataset, when using best attributes for
each user as compared to using all attributes for each user
Attributes Specificity Sensitivity Precision F-measure Accuracy
All 97.2\% 72.7\% 85.7\% 0.787 92.6\%
Best 96.8\% 77.4\% 84.5\% 0.808 93.2\%
the results showed that it did not provide the best trade-off for any of the 26 users.
Table 7.3 shows that using PCA to select optimal set of attributes produces best
results for 8 users while using information gain is best for 9 users. Additionally, there
are 9 users for whom using the entire set of attributes produces the best trade-off. It is
worth noting, however, that there were 17 users for whom all three types of attributes
(type and strength of relationship as well as content) were represented in the particular
attributes that contributed to the classifier (either PCA or Information Gain) and 9 other
users for whom at least two types of attributes were represented. This highlights the
importance of considering all three types of attributes while designing REACT.
Table 7.4 shows the performance of REACT evaluated over the entire dataset of
68,840 access control decisions made by all users when:
1. All attributes discussed in Section 7.1 were used for each of the 26 users.
2. Only the best subset of attributes was used for each individual user.
It is evident from the table that using the best attribute subset provides a better
overall trade-off as compared to using all attributes for all users as it provides a big
improvement in terms of sensitivity at the expense of very little change in precision. This
results in an improved F-measure and a higher accuracy is also observed.
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7.2.3.1 User Characteristics
Having seen the benefits of using the most appropriate subset of attributes, it was
important to try and understand whether it is possible to recommend a particular
attribute subset (PCA, Information Gain or All Attributes) for an individual user by
looking at their characteristics. This would enable early identification of a personalized
approach for REACT and mitigate a ``cold start"" in terms of not requiring a lot of
decisions in order to ascertain the most appropriate approach for a user.
Table 7.5 shows the characteristics of users for whom each of the attribute subset
produced best performance. There was a statistically significant difference in terms
of average audience (across 10 photos per user) (p < 0.05) and standard deviation
audience (across 10 photos per user) (p < 0.05) using the Kruskal-Wallis Test. The
Mann-Whitney test found that the 8 users for whom PCA was the most suitable approach
had a statistically significantly lower average (p < 0.05) and standard deviation audience
(p < 0.05) than the other 18 users. There were no statistically significant differences
between the users for whom using Information Gain was found to be most suitable and
for whom using all attributes provided best results. Looking at other characteristics,
which do not have statistically significant difference, it is evident that PCA can be used
to select attributes, starting from the original configuration of REACT described earlier,
for users who have smaller friend networks and who select from a smaller section of
their network as shown by their higher blacklist rate (ratio of total friends who were
blacklisted), lower allow ratio (percentage of total access control decisions which were
``allow"") and smaller number of communities used.
7.3 Discussion
This section discusses the major findings from the empirical evaluation of REACT
presented in this chapter.
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Table 7.5: User characteristics to identify suitable subset of attributes to configure REACT
Attribute Subset
Total Blacklist Audience (10 photos) Communities
Allow Ratio
Friends Rate Average* Stdev* Total Used
Principal Components Avg 214.8 72.1\% 13.5 15.2 6.1 5.2 6.1\%
(8 users) SD 115.2 29\% 18.3 19.4 4.3 4.5 6.3\%
Information Gain Avg 322.4 61.1\% 33.4 38.1 9.8 8.7 14\%
(9 users) SD 150.8 26.8\% 22.7 27.9 6.6 6 15.1\%
All Attributes Avg 251.6 51.1\% 42.9 43.1 9.6 8.9 17.6\%
(9 users) SD 69.1 27\% 32.1 28.3 6.1 6.6 15.4\%
*Significant difference with Kruskal-Wallis Test (p <0.05)
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Overlapping Communities produce better results
REACT was implemented with different values of ``k"" in order to check whether consid-
ering overlapping communities improves quality of the access control recommendations.
The results showed that REACT provides best recommendations for k = 3 which indicates
some overlap between communities. This is also closer to real-life scenarios where a
particular member of a user's social network may have more than one type of relationship
with them (for e.g. a friend can also be a co-worker).
Class Balancer provides best overall trade-off
It was observed that REACT produced high accuracy (94.9\%) and specificity (97.8\%)
in the baseline mode of operation (with k = 3). However, the values of precision and
sensitivity were relatively low. Several class balancing techniques were tried to improve
the performance of REACT with respect to these metrics and it was observed that using
the Class Balancer filter improved sensitivity and precision substantially with very little
change in accuracy and specificity and hence provided the best overall trade-off.
Personalizing REACT improves performance
It was interesting to examine whether the configuration of REACT could be personalized
depending on the access control behavior of various users. Principal Components Analysis
(PCA) and Information Gain were utilized as methods to identify the ideal subset of
attributes to be considered by REACT for each individual user. The results showed that
using the baseline configuration including all attributes produced best trade-off for 9
users while the other 17 benefited from using either PCA (8 users) or Information Gain
(9 users). PCA was found to be the most appropriate attribute selection technique for
users who have smaller friend networks and who select from a smaller section of their
network.
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7.4 Conclusion
The empirical evaluation of REACT presented in this chapter shows that it performs very
well with respect to all the metrics, namely, specificity, sensitivity, precision, F-measure
and accuracy. It is especially important to note that REACT produces very high values
for specificity and accuracy in almost all the configurations discussed in this chapter.
Specificity can be considered very important in an access control scenario as a high value
signifies a high ``true negative rate"" which means that the members who are originally
intended to be denied access by the user are more likely to be recommended a ``deny""
decision by REACT. Thus, a high specificity shows that REACT is more likely to correctly
predict the members of a user's friend network who should not be granted access and
thus is capable of mitigating unintended disclosure of information. Nevertheless, for the
overall performance of REACT, it is essential to have a high value for other metrics such
as precision, sensitivity and especially F-measure which signifies the overall quality of
classification. A low F-measure with a high specificity would suggest that while REACT
is providing recommendations which enable safeguarding of privacy of the user as no
information is shared to unintended audiences, the user would have to overturn a large
number of ``deny"" recommendations to allow access to their desired audience which
would require a lot of effort from them. A high F-measure, on the other hand, suggests
that REACT is making fewer errors in predicting both types of access control decisions
(``allow"" and ``deny"") and hence minimizes the burden on the users of having to modify
the recommendations to achieve their desired access control policy.
This chapter also discusses the potential of personalizing REACT by acknowledging
the fact that privacy is personal and a ``one-size-fits-all"" solution may not be feasible to
be implemented in a real-life scenario. The design of REACT can be easily adapted to
accommodate personalization by implementing established feature selection techniques
discussed in this chapter. The results show that using Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) to select the most appropriate attribute set for users who grant access to a smaller
section of their friend network may improve performance of REACT even more. When
the most suitable configuration of REACT is implemented for each of the 26 users
108
Chapter 7: Implementing and Evaluating REACT
in the dataset, the average values for each of the metrics are: Specificity = 96.8\%,




Conclusions and Future Work
The work presented in this thesis aims to enhance access control mechanisms in social
media and ease the burden on social media users by providing them with accurate and
contextual access control recommendations. The systematization of literature and social
media infrastructure presented in Chapter 2 highlighted the absence of access control
mechanisms which consider the overall context of information disclosed by users on
social media sites. The primary contribution of the thesis is REACT, an access control
recommendation mechanism which leverages interpersonal relationships between the
users and each of their friends, by using attributes to define them in terms of type as
well as strength in conjunction with information about the content.
8.1 Major Findings
This section highlights the major findings of this thesis in a nutshell.
CP has best fit with access control decisions
Chapter 5 presented detailed results of an empirical evaluation of 8 popular community
detection algorithms with the objective of finding the algorithm which produced commu-
nities having the best fit with access control decisions made by users during a user study.
The results helped identify CP as the algorithm which produced communities which had
the best fit with access control decisions made by users. Therefore, this algorithm was
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chosen to represent relationship type in the implementation of REACT presented in
Chapter 7.
Total Friends and Mutual Friends are most suitable profile attributes to pre-
dict access control decisions
A detailed evaluation of 30 profile attributes was presented in Chapter 6 which resulted in
the identification of Total Friends (size of network) and Mutual Friends (shared contacts)
as the most suitable profile attributes to predict access control decisions. Therefore, these
two attributes in addition to Friend Difference (difference in size of network, which can
be derived from Total Friends) were selected to represent relationship strength in the
implementation of REACT.
REACT produces highly accurate access control recommendations
The evaluation of the performance of REACT with an implementation where relationship
type was represented by CP membership, relationship strength was represented by total
friends, mutual friends and friend difference and information about the content was
provided in the form of social and topical tags provided by the users, was presented
in Chapter 7. The results show that REACT produces highly accurate access control
recommendations while also maintaining high values for specificity, which is important
in an access control scenario. Chapter 7 also described several enhancements to the
baseline implementation of REACT by showing that using class balancer filter improves
the precision and sensitivity while maintaining the high accuracy and specificity of the
recommendations. The chapter further discussed the ability of REACT to be personalized
and presented results when established feature selection techniques, namely, Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) and Information Gain were used to select the appropriate
set of attributes for each user. The findings showed that using PCA to select attributes
for users who grant access to smaller section of their friend network further enhances the
performance of REACT.
111
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work
REACT can be extended to other social networks
REACT was implemented as a Facebook application for the analyses presented in this
thesis as it is widely acknowledged to be the most widely used online social network.
The analyses led to the identification of attributes to represent the components of
REACT, namely, community membership for relationship type (Chapter 5) and size
of network (total friends) and common connections (mutual friends) for relationship
strength (Chapter 6). REACT can be easily implemented in other social networks as
these identified attributes are generally available in most online social networks. It must
be noted that REACT will have maximum utility in social networks where the users
have greater granularity in terms of creating access control policies and they are able to
make access control decisions with respect to individual contacts (or ``friends""). REACT
can then assist the users by making access control recommendations for each of their
contacts, as has been demonstrated in this thesis. However, in some social networks such
as Twitter, which primarily have a ``follower-broadcaster"" model of social engagement,
REACT may not be very useful. These social networks do not provide the user with the
opportunity of making individual access control decisions with respect to each of their
contacts. They can either broadcast the content publicly or just share it with all of their
contacts (``protected"" tweets are only shared with ``followers"" on Twitter).
8.2 Limitations
A limitation of the work presented in this thesis is that the collected data and the
subsequent analyses is reliant on the activity of users during the user study described
in Chapter 4. This is the way in which most related work evaluate similar mechanisms,
and in the absence of any publicly available datasets, conducting a user study to obtain
ground truth data was deemed to be the most suitable way. The dataset used for the
analysis presented in this thesis contains 68,840 access control decisions which is much
higher than previous related works [FL10, AFW12, SSLW11, ACF12]. There is always
the possibility that fatigue may influence the user study as the users had to make access
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control decisions and select categories as well as tag any friends for 10 photos sequentially.
However, the data suggests that this was not necessarily the case as as there were only 2
users whose number of ``allow"" decisions decreased after the first photo and many users
had audience size of above 50 for the last photo.
A limitation specific to the analysis presented in Chapter 6 is the comparatively
reduced size of the dataset of access control decisions which could be considered to evaluate
profile attributes of the participants' friends. This was due to the API restrictions imposed
by Facebook1 (as discussed in Section 6.2.1) which meant that profile information of
only users who participated in the user study was available. We did mitigate this by
encouraging groups of people to participate in the study so that a particular participant
would have some Facebook friends also participating in the study which would enable us
to get their profile information. The participants, however, were unaware of this limitation
and made access control decisions for all their friends normally. They were not informed
of this limitation to avoid biasing their access control decisions. The identification of
Total Friends and Mutual Friends to represent relationship strength ensures that future
implementations of REACT will not have this limitation as this information is generally
available in social media profiles, even with the restrictions, and are shown to accurately
predict access control decisions in the analysis presented in Chapter 6.
8.3 Future Work
This section discusses some of the future directions in which research can progress on the
basis of the findings of this thesis.
8.3.1 REACT for Mobile Platforms
A possible future work is to implement REACT on mobile platforms as the attributes
considered in this thesis do not consider contextual information which can be gathered
from mobile activity. It is undeniable that the advent of mobile applications for social
media activity have introduced new information which can constitute the context of
1https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apps/upgrading
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information disclosure. Contextual information such as location, for example, assume a
far greater role when the user is sharing information via mobile platforms. It has already
been shown, for example, that co-location as determined from mobile sensor data of
individuals, can influence access control policies [MS12]. A possible future work can be to
extend the design of REACT to include information available from mobile phones, such
as GPS location, contact lists, etc., which were not relevant in the current evaluation
presented in this thesis as REACT was implemented to be used as a desktop Facebook
application.
8.3.2 Integrating REACT with Audience Visualization Tools
REACT has been found to recommend highly accurate access control decisions to
social media users. It was discussed in Chapter 2 that in addition to access control
recommendation, another way of enhancing existing access control mechanisms is to
provide better visualization of the audience of the information being shared by the user.
Future work may focus on integrating the access control recommendation of REACT with
audience visualization tools such as ``Audience View"" [LBW08] to enhance comprehension
of the access control recommendations made by REACT which can be provided to the
users in a more actionable way.
8.3.3 Incorporating Multi-party Privacy
Another possible line of future work is to accommodate multi-party privacy into REACT.
The design would have to be extended in a way in which the access control preferences of
``other parties"" (users other than the one who shares the content) related to the content
(for e.g. appearing in a photo) are considered in the recommendation process. As outlined
in Chapter 2, multi-party privacy is a very active area of research and there are several
methods suggested in literature to try and achieve an agreement of access control policy
to safeguard multi-party privacy issues, including bidding mechanisms, where the policy
with most bids is adopted [SSP09], voting mechanisms either to obtain a majority [CF11]
or ``veto voting"" [TGN10] and game-theoretic approaches [SR16, HAZY14]. One or more
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of these approaches could be included in the design of REACT to try and safeguard
multi-party privacy when providing access control recommendations.
8.3.4 Access Control Recommendation on Social Media Aggregators (SMAs)
Social Media Aggregators (SMAs) are applications which enable the users to access
multiple social media accounts from one mobile application. While this has many
advantages in terms of ease of use (not having to install separate applications for
different social media accounts) and management of resources such as battery, phone
memory (one application replacing many), it has several obvious privacy implications.
We performed an initial privacy assessment of SMAs which highlighted the potential
privacy implications arising from the unique combination of phone data (such as contacts,
sms, call records, etc.) with the users' activity on multiple social media accounts being
used via the SMA [MSG17]. An interesting future work might be to understand how
people manage audiences on SMAs, as there is a much larger scope of a ``context collapse""
due to the possibility of sharing information on multiple social networks simultaneously,
and subsequently evaluate the possibility of access control recommendation for these
applications.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
The work presented in this thesis tackles the problem of ``unintended disclosure"" which
leads to privacy breaches for social media users. The main contribution of this thesis
is REACT, which provides accurate access control recommendations to social media
users using very little information about their friend network and without requiring any
personal information. REACT can be implemented according to the requirements of the
particular social media infrastructure as it uses information that is generally available
in most, if not all, social networks. The evaluation of REACT presented in this thesis
shows that the design is implementable and testing its performance with users in the wild
would be a natural next step. As part of this implementation process, careful attention
shall be paid to ensure the usability of REACT and its recommendations. This is crucial
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to ensure recommendations are incorporated easily and seamlessly into users' normal use
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